Odious, Not Debt by Gelpern, Anna
05__GELPERN.DOC 12/6/2007 9:00:26 AM 
 
ODIOUS, NOT DEBT 
ANNA GELPERN* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
REAL PROBLEMS AND ORPHAN DOCTRINES 
The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 revived public and academic debate about 
a wobbly old doctrine of international law: the Doctrine of Odious Debt.1 As 
formulated in 1927, Odious Debt allows governments to disavow debts incurred 
by their predecessors without the consent of or benefit for the people, provided 
creditors knew of the taint. The doctrine has roots in nineteenth century jostles 
over colonial possessions. Few countries have invoked Odious Debt as grounds 
for repudiation;2 none has succeeded. 
To be sure, the problem of debt incurred by vile regimes to finance evil 
deeds precedes colonialism and has yet to be solved. But for the past eighty 
years, Odious Debt’s rhetorical appeal has vastly outstripped its “legal vitality.”3 
Bypassing the doctrine, countries and their creditors have addressed odiousness 
by proxy—using economic necessity, rather than fraud or political taint, as 
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 1. E.g., Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati & Robert B. Thompson, The Dilemma of Odious Debts, 
56 DUKE L. J. 1201 (2007); Seema Jayachandran & Michael Kremer, Odious Debt, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 
82 (2006); Center for Int’l Sustainable Development Law, Advancing the Odious Debt Doctrine 13–21 
(CISDL Working Paper No COM/RES/ESJ, Mar. 11, 2003), available at http://www.odiousdebts.org/ 
odiousdebts/publications/Advancing_the_Odious_Debt_Doctrine.pdf. [hereinafter Advancing Odious 
Debt]; Odious Debts, http://www.odiousdebts.org (last visited Jan. 20, 2007); Jubilee Iraq, 
http://www.jubileeiraq.org (last visited Jan. 20, 2007). 
 2. See, e.g., Jackson v. People’s Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490, 1495 (11th Cir. 1986) (discussed 
in James V. Feinerman, Odious Debt, Old and New: The Legal Intellectual History of an Idea, 70 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming Autumn 2007)). But see Jeff King, The Doctrine of Odious Debt in 
International Law: A Restatement (Jan. 21, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) 
(including a broader range of incidents when states refused to assume responsibility for debt whose 
legitimacy had been questioned, without necessarily invoking the term or the doctrine of Odious Debt). 
 3. “Iraq’s need for very substantial debt relief derives from . . . economic realities . . . . Principles 
of public international law such as the odious debt doctrine, whatever their legal vitality, are not the 
reason why Iraq is seeking this debt relief.” Felix Salmon, Restructuring Debt is Top Priority, 
EUROMONEY, Sept. 2004, at 76 (interview with Adil Abdul Mahdi, Minister of Finance in the interim 
government of Iraq). 
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grounds for debt relief. Some explanations for Odious Debt’s disuse criticize its 
vague, complex, and politically fraught criteria for repudiation and its 
unworkable institutional arrangements;4 this author has suggested that readily 
available alternatives achieve a similar financial outcome faster.5 This article 
raises a different concern. It argues that the Doctrine of Odious Debt frames 
the problem of odious debt in a way that excludes a large number, perhaps the 
majority, of problematic obligations incurred in the second half of the twentieth 
century. 
Advocacy and academic literature traditionally describe the odious debt 
problem as one of government contracts with private creditors. These turn 
odious when borrowing officials abuse the public trust by diverting the 
proceeds, abetted (and occasionally bribed) by their bankers.6 Solving the 
problem thus defined requires both ridding the people of the debt and 
discouraging private creditors from financing evil going forward. But in the 
latest crop of cases, including Iraq, Liberia, and Nigeria, private creditors 
represent a small fraction of the old regime’s debts. Most of the creditors are 
other governments and public institutions. In Iraq and Liberia, public (official) 
credits outnumbered private credits at least six to one before debt relief; in 
Nigeria official creditors held over seventy percent of all sovereign debt 
compared to six percent for foreign private creditors.7 Many governments lent 
for the specific purpose of propping up odious but friendly regimes, not to make 
money off the coupons. Transfers took the form of loans rather than grants 
because loans were more palatable to donor country taxpayers.  In such cases, 
the prospect of repudiation may not have dissuaded officials quite as readily as 
it might private bankers. 
The predominance of private creditors in the Odious Debt literature is a 
relic of the early twentieth century, when governments financed themselves 
almost entirely from private sources. The predominance of official creditors in 
the odious debt problem poses a distinct challenge. The most practical 
proposals to deal with odious debts to private creditors—using domestic 
contracts, agency, and corporate law doctrines—do not help with official debt. 
These doctrines may have moral sway but have no legal force against public 
creditors.8 On the other hand, the law of state succession and sovereign-debt 
practice fail to address the diversity of sovereign obligations, including official 
 
 4. Buchheit et al., supra note 1, at 1203–04. 
 5. Anna Gelpern, What Iraq and Argentina Might Learn from Each Other, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 391, 
410, 413 (2005). 
 6. Buchheit et al., supra note 1, at 1218. 
 7. From Joint BIS, IMF, OECD and World Bank External Debt Statistics for 2003Q4, Joint 
External Debt Hub, http://devdata.worldbank.org/sdmx/jedh/jedh_dbase.html (last visited Jan. 25, 
2007) (click to view data from 2003Q1 to 2004Q4). 
 8. Government creditors generally do not sue other states in domestic courts. See infra note 61 
and accompanying text. Domestic doctrines have analogues in the law of treaties. See, e.g., Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties 46–53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. Because official debt 
documentation conventions are murky and inconsistent, see infra notes 75–76 and accompanying text, 
the law of treaties is unlikely to offer satisfactory answers. 
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debt, in a coherent and principled fashion. The result is a set of binary outcomes 
(repudiation or full succession), a convoluted web of restructuring fora, and ad 
hoc restructuring rules that use financial necessity to mask political 
accommodation. 
Meeting the challenge requires a better understanding of the difference 
between private and official debt. The two categories of debt share formal 
similarities (such as the promise to repay), but are far apart in substance. Unlike 
private debt, official debt is never extended at arm’s length or for direct 
economic gain;9 the usual goal is policy influence over the borrower. 
Governments often lend in dire economic circumstances where no arm’s length 
money is available and repayment prospects are dim. Some officials may prefer 
to give outright grants, but settle for loans in the face of domestic political 
opposition; others prefer the loan form because it reinforces a long-term 
political relationship. Are these transfers really debt? 
This article suggests that they are not. Implications from this proposition are 
central to any comprehensive treatment of the odious debt problem and go 
beyond odious debt. Concluding that some or all official debt is not debt raises 
new questions. If it is not debt, what is it? The most popular answer is “grant,” 
but this answer ignores the complexity of form and motive in official transfers. 
Most official transfers in loan form look nothing like altruistic, discretionary 
gifts. And lurching to grants does not answer the question of why parties 
bothered to document the transaction as debt, even when in substance it lacked 
most traditional characteristics of arm’s length lending. Outside the sovereign 
context, debt is one of many kinds of financial obligations that differ in priority 
of repayment, control rights, and other attributes. The sovereign world is not 
altogether different in practice. But in theory, all sovereign obligations are part 
of one great mass of senior unsecured debt, where all creditors are equal under 
law.10 
This article uses the case of official debt as a starting point to explore the 
significance of debt form in sovereign finance. It focuses on the apparent 
disconnect between the form of official transfers and the substance of the 
economic and political relationship it represents to draw out some implications 
for debates about odious debt. Leading theories about sovereign debt and 
odious debt generally elide the question whether a particular payment 
obligation that purports to be debt is in fact debt, and what makes it so. This 
 
 9. This does not rule out economic considerations altogether: official export promotion aims to 
boost economic growth and job creation in the creditor country; however, this is distinct from making 
money off the export finance transaction itself. 
 10. For criticisms of the lack of formal priorities in sovereign debt, see Patrick Bolton & David A. 
Skeel, Jr., Inside the Black Box: How Should a Sovereign Bankruptcy Framework Be Structured?, 53 
EMORY L.J. 763 (2004); Anna Gelpern, Building a Better Seating Chart for Sovereign Restructurings, 53 
EMORY L.J. 1119 (2004); Jeromin Zettelmeyer, The Case for an Explicit Seniority Structure in Sovereign 
Debt (Int’l Monetary Fund, Research Dep’t, Working Paper, Sept. 29, 2003). 
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question is a staple preoccupation of corporate finance11 and debtor–creditor 
law.12 For example, U.S. domestic law doctrines of equitable subordination and 
recharacterization of claims in bankruptcy directly address the gap between the 
form and substance of an obligation and prescribe remedies. Both doctrines 
move claims back in the asset distribution line13 based either on creditor 
misbehavior or on the economic essence of the transaction. This article looks to 
the moral impulse behind the two doctrines for insights on dealing with official 
debt generally and, in particular, with the problem of odious official debt. 
Applied to odious debt, analysis grounded in the concepts of subordination 
and payment priorities modulates the “all-or-nothing” approach to state and 
government succession with respect to debts that prevails under public 
international law, including the doctrine of Odious Debt. It suggests a unified 
framework for addressing the challenges of political transition and financial 
restructuring, which are at the core of the odious debt dilemma. And it departs 
from both the economic theories of sovereign debt and the law of state 
succession by focusing on the actions and motives of creditors, which have 
received scant attention to date. 
Even as it illuminates an important aspect of the odious debt problem, 
subordination-inspired analysis—like most private law analogies—does not 
yield obvious policy prescriptions. It could support radical alternatives, such as 
subordinating all official debt to all private debt within the existing institutional 
structure, or it could offer a template for case-by-case analysis of individual 
credits so as to subordinate the most odious of the lot. This article sketches out 
some of these possibilities but refrains from specific policy proposals. This is 
because any policy design based on the analytical framework suggested here 
would go far beyond the problem of odious debt and the scope of this 
symposium. The aim of this project is not to come up with a definitive policy 
solution, but rather to contribute to a more frank and principled discussion on 
the meaning and implications of “debt” in sovereign debt. 
The next section of this article highlights aspects of the Odious Debt 
Doctrine that may help account for its sparse use. Part III explores the 
phenomenon of government-to-government debt against the background of 
theories about sovereign debt and foreign aid. Part IV introduces the doctrines 
 
 11. See WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 173–75 (5th ed. 
2003) for an overview. The broader subject of inconsistency between legal form and economic 
substance in financial transactions is at the center of a large tax law literature and related writing on 
financial innovation. E.g., Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Financial Contract Innovation and Income Tax Policy, 
107 HARV. L. REV. 460 (1993); Michael S. Knoll, Put-Call Parity and the Law, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 61 
(2002). 
 12. See, e.g., MARK S. SCARBERRY, KENNETH N. KLEE, GRANT W. NEWTON & STEVE H. 
NICKLES, BUSINESS REORGANIZATION IN BANKRUPTCY: CASES AND MATERIALS 585–618 (3d ed. 
2006) (discussing recharacterization and equitable subordination in corporate bankruptcy); David Gray 
Carlson, The Logical Structure of Fraudulent Transfers and Equitable Subordination, 45 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 157 (2003) (resituating equitable subordination outside bankruptcy). 
 13. See John D. Penn, Moving Someone Else to the End of the Line, 15-8 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 36 
(1996) (discussing the equitable powers of the bankruptcy court). 
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of equitable subordination and recharacterization. Part V examines the 
potential relevance of these doctrines to odious debt and sovereign debt.  Part 
VI concludes. 
II 
PUBLIC REMEDIES, PRIVATE  
CREDITORS, AND THE PERILS OF DOCTRINE DESIGN 
If odious debt is law, it is a doctrine of public-international law aspiring to 
the status of customary international law.14 To qualify as custom, a legal norm 
traditionally must “harden” through general, consistent practice of states over 
time, which must be “accepted as law”—that is, experienced as binding and 
legal, rather than habitual, discretionary, or accidental.15 The subjective element 
(opinio juris) often resides in state pronouncements—official statements, laws, 
or treaties. States can resist, or at least slow down, custom formation by publicly 
protesting a nascent norm, denying its legal status or its applicability to them.16 
Odious Debt has had trouble with both practice and opinio juris. As others 
recount in detail in this volume and elsewhere, states have invoked elements of 
the doctrine in a small handful of reported legal incidents.17 In each case, 
prominent jurists groused, a key party protested, the arbiter balked or split the 
baby, or debt relief was granted on other grounds.18 
Odious Debt’s high point as a doctrine may have been the day in 1927 when 
it was put to paper by Russian émigré jurist Alexander Sack.19 Sack pulled 
 
 14. See, e.g., Christoph G. Paulus, Odious Debts vs. Debt Trap: A Realistic Help?, 31 BROOK. J. 
INT’L L. 83, 91 (2005) (noting that odious debt does not meet the criteria for custom). 
 15. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), Oct. 24, 1945, 832 U.S.T.S. (The 
Court shall apply “international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law). Custom 
formation and its two elements—practice and opinio juris—are the subject of a vast literature and many 
famous domestic and international cases. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (custom as 
“ancient usage among civilized nations, beginning centuries ago and ripening into a rule of 
international law” prohibits capture of fishing smacks as prize of war). But see Case Concerning 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States) (Merits) 
1986 ICJ 14, para. 186 (finding customary law against intervention and use of force: “The Court does 
not consider that, for a rule to be established as customary, the corresponding practice must be in 
absolutely rigorous conformity with the rule.”). 
 16. However, once a norm has hardened, objectors may have a hard time escaping its application. 
Jonathan Charney, The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Customary International Law, 
56 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1 (1985). 
 17. See Buchheit et al., supra note 1, at 1212–13, 1216–17, 1221 nn.58 & 59, 1229, 1235 n.106 
(discussing the cases of Mexico, England, the Philippines, Costa Rica, China, and Iran). No doubt more 
states have invoked the doctrine in private debt negotiations; however, the results had no reference to 
it, which would make such invocations dubious for custom formation purposes. But see King, supra 
note 2 (ascribing legal significance to less formal invocations of odiousness). 
 18. Tai-Heng Cheng, Renegotiating the Odious Debt Doctrine, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 14–
19 (Summer 2007); ERNST H. FEILCHENFELD, PUBLIC DEBTS AND STATE SUCCESSION 337–43 (1931); 
D. P. O’CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. I, 458–
61 (1967); A.N. SACK, RAZVERSTKA GOSUDARSTVENNYKH DOLGOV 19–22 (1923). 
 19. Alexander N. Sack, Les Effets des Transformations des Etats sur Leurs Dettes Publiques et 
Autres Obligations Financieres (Recueil Sirey 1927), in PATRICIA ADAMS, ODIOUS DEBTS: LOOSE 
LENDING, CORRUPTION, AND THE THIRD WORLD’S ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY 165 (Probe 1991), 
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together disparate grounds on which states had tried to walk away from 
deposed rulers’ debts in the preceding decades and distilled them into three 
necessary elements: (1) despotic rule (also known as lack of consent on the part 
of the population), (2) lack of benefit for the people (a use-of-proceeds test), 
and (3) knowledge of the above on the part of the creditors.20 Sack situated his 
doctrine in the law of state succession. The reasons likely reflected both the 
state of the world and the state of the law at the time. The practice and 
pronouncements on which Sack drew generally involved transfers of territory, 
in which “change in sovereignty” was undisputed. Early twentieth-century 
international jurisprudence sharply distinguished between state and 
government succession.21 The former involved a break in territorial sovereignty 
and complex questions of allocating legal rights and duties among the 
predecessor and successor sovereigns. The latter came with an overwhelming 
presumption of continuity in obligations, which was then and is now among the 
“hardest” of custom.22 Accepting the distinction and tying the young doctrine’s 
fortunes to state succession made it more difficult to use outside the context of 
imperial disintegration. In cases involving no significant change of territory, 
debt-relief advocates are stuck arguing either that deposing a tyrant amounts to 
a change in sovereignty or that Odious Debt should be revised to discard the 
state succession component.23 Both arguments are plausible; neither is user-
friendly. 
Two other features of the doctrine stem from the circumstances of its birth. 
First, as Buchheit, Gulati, and Thompson point out, Sack’s search for public-
international-law solutions reflects the fact that in 1927 private creditors had no 
private means of enforcing sovereign debts.24  When the Odious Debt doctrine 
was born, states were absolutely immune from lawsuits in national courts. They 
repaid under political and military pressure from the creditors’ governments. In 
 
excerpt available at http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/index.cfm?DSP=subcontent&AreaID=3. 
Sack’s motives are not entirely clear. He was writing at a time when Russia’s Bolshevik government 
was repudiating debts contracted by its Tzarist predecessors. As an émigré, Sack was not a natural 
Bolshevik sympathizer. See SACK, supra note 18, at 10 n.3 and Buchheit et al., supra note 1, at 1224. See 
Larry Catá Backer, Odious Debt Wears Two Faces: Systemic Illegitimacy, Problems, and Opportunities 
in Traditional Odious Debt Conceptions in Globalized Economic Regimes, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. (forthcoming Autumn 2007) for an in-depth analysis of the French text. 
 20. Practice against succession is somewhat more consistent with respect to the narrower category 
of “war debts,” contracted to finance military operations against the successor regime. O’CONNELL, 
supra note 18, at 461–62. 
 21. Id. at 4–8. 
 22. E.g., Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. State of Russia, 21 F.2d 396, 401 (2d Cir 1927); Great Britain v. 
Costa Rica, 1 RIAA 375 (1923) [hereinafter Tinoco Arbitration]. 
 23. See, e.g., Advancing Odious Debt, supra note 1. Sack may well have favored narrow 
application.  See, e.g., SACK, supra note 18, at 5–10, 19–22 (discussing precedent in favor of succession 
following regime change involving no change in territory, and apportionment following territorial 
change); Buchheit et al., supra note 1, at 1223. 
 24. Buchheit et al., supra note 1, at 1260. Criticizing a different aspect of Sack’s theory, O’Connell 
notes that Sack’s analytical framework “was rendered necessary by his adherence to the view that 
international law is a law between States only”; hence states could not acquire duties to (private) 
creditors under international law. O’CONNELL, supra note 18, at 374. 
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that world, the function of Odious Debt was to get diplomats and gunboats off 
debtors’ backs. Today, sovereign immunity is restricted, states get sued all the 
time, and domestic-law doctrines offer direct financial and moral redress.25 
The second relic of Sack’s time is that the doctrinal edifice of Odious Debt is 
built around obligations owed by states to private creditors. One reason for this 
may have been the view that state succession specifically excluded obligations 
of “political” character.26 The status of government-to-government lending 
would be difficult to determine in this context. As discussed in Part III below, 
many if not most such debts could qualify as political by some measure. If some 
or all financial obligations to other states were viewed as political, not 
economic, repudiating them would require no new doctrine. Aside from the 
difficulty of choosing sides between “political” and “economic” in this 
argument, state practice has increasingly favored assumption of official debt, 
followed by debt-relief negotiations based on financial necessity.27 
Another reason for the focus on private creditors may have been even more 
pragmatic—they were the only ones on the scene. Governments borrowed 
almost entirely from private creditors well into the second half of the twentieth 
century.28 Forty years after Sack’s codification project, prominent commentators 
noted the existence of public creditors but dismissed them as statistically 
marginal.29 Yet Cold War politics and development policy trends were already 
spawning large-scale official loan programs. 
Official lending continued apace for the remainder of the century, even as 
its composition changed with economic, political, and intellectual 
developments.30 The world of sovereign debt became increasingly bifurcated 
 
 25. See, e.g., Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607 (1992) (applying the commercial 
activity exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act). 
 26. O’CONNELL, supra note 18, at 11. 
 27. See LEX RIEFFEL, RESTRUCTURING SOVEREIGN DEBT: THE CASE FOR AD HOC MACHINERY 
24–44 (2003). For example, Russia agreed to assume the debts of the USSR but rescheduled them 
under the auspices of the Paris Club of official bilateral creditors. Russia continued to service post-
Soviet era debt. The distinction was clearly and transparently political; the solution was ad hoc and 
based on financial necessity.  See, e.g., Russia: Paris Club Press Release April 29, 1996, available at 
http://www.clubdeparis.org/sections/services/communiques/russie/viewLanguage/en (last visited May 7, 
2007) (announcing “a comprehensive rescheduling of the debts owed to the Creditor Countries 
contracted or guaranteed on behalf of the Government of the Former Soviet Union for which the 
Government of the Russian Federation has agreed to be responsible”). 
 28. For historical accounts of sovereign borrowing, see VINOD K. AGGARWAL, DEBT GAMES: 
STRATEGIC INTERACTION IN INTERNATIONAL DEBT RESCHEDULING (1996); Albert Fishlow, The 
Debt Crisis in Historical Perspective, in THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL DEBT 37 (Miles Kahler ed., 
1986); and Barry Eichengreen & Michael Bordo, Crises Now and Then: What Lessons from the Last 
Era of Financial Globalization? (Nov. 2001) (unpublished paper, available at 
http://www.econ.berkeley.edu/~eichengr/research/goodhartfestschriftjan9.pdf). 
 29. For example, O’Connell’s still-classic treatise on succession, published in 1967, situates Odious 
Debt as part of the doctrine of acquired rights, which governs succession in private parties’ claims 
against one another and the state. The author specifically raises the subject of official debt, but 
proceeds to limit the analysis to private debt, apparently because it is much more pervasive. 
O’CONNELL, supra note 18, at 369. 
 30. For statistics on official lending from 1960 through 2005 as reported by creditor states, see 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Development Cooperation Directorate—
05__GELPERN.DOC 12/6/2007  9:00:26 AM 
88 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 70:81 
between middle-income countries (such as Chile) that had some access to 
private financial markets, and poor countries (such as Uganda) that had none. 
A central problem for the first lot was extreme volatility; for the second, it was 
the poverty trap. With no market access, no tax base, no savings, and no 
infrastructure to attract investment,31 the second group came to depend on 
transfers from a small group of official donors to finance basic needs. And 
although corrupt despots surfaced at every point on the income spectrum, the 
odious debt problem had more practical urgency in poor countries. Their debt, 
odious and otherwise, was overwhelmingly official. But the law of odious debt, 
such as it was, did not change. 
The most recent doctrinal work, prompted in large part by the exit of 
Saddam Hussein, still essentially targets private creditors. Government debts 
receive an occasional courtesy mention, but their presence has no noticeable 
impact on the analysis.  A focus on private creditors is perhaps the only point of 
intersection for two important but very different Iraq-inspired proposals: 
Jayachandran and Kremer’s financial-sanctions regime, and Buchheit, Gulati, 
and Thompson’s private-law remedies.32 Jayachandran and Kremer seek above 
all to create ex ante incentives for creditors to stop financing despots. Their 
proposal would make all loans to sanctioned countries unenforceable. Buchheit, 
Gulati, and Thompson focus instead on permitting countries to breach loan 
contracts ex post, after loan proceeds are misappropriated. They look to 
domestic contract, agency, and corporate law doctrines for remedies.33 
In both proposals official creditors are barely affected. The sanctions 
proposal adds little to the official debt status quo for two reasons. First, its focus 
on legal enforcement is irrelevant to government creditors because they do not 
sue. It is difficult to imagine a power that would refuse to sell arms on credit to 
a puppet regime for fear of enforcement problems under a successor. The point 
of the loan is precisely to prevent the successor’s emergence.34 Second, when 
states agree to impose sanctions restricting the rights of private creditors, it is 
quite likely that traditional sanctions directly applicable to governments (for 
 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC), Development Database on Aid from DAC, 
www.oecd.org (last visited Jan. 20, 2007). For purposes of this article, these are adequate as proxy for 
broader trends in official transfers.  For debtor-reported statistics from 1970 through 2005, including 
lending by non-OECD states, see The World Bank, Global Development Finance 2006, Vol. II (2006).  
Individual categories, such as bilateral, multilateral, development lending, and export credits move over 
time; recipients also vary. For example, in the 1970s G-7 bilateral development aid begins shifting to 
grants, but export credits and multilateral aid continue in loan form.  Economic and humanitarian crises 
trigger spikes in both loans and grants. 
 31. Jeffrey D. Sachs, John W. McArthur, Guido Schodt-Traub, Margaret Kruk, Chandrika 
Bahadur, Michael Faye & Gordon McCord, Ending Africa’s Poverty Trap, 2004 BROOKINGS PAPERS 
ON ECON. ACTIVITY 117, 122 (2004). 
 32. Buchheit et al., supra note 1; Jayachandran & Kremer, supra note 1. 
 33. Adam Feibelman makes a parallel argument using a different set of domestic-law doctrines. See 
generally Adam Feibelman, Equitable Subordination, Fraudulent Transfer, and Sovereign Debt, 70 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming Autumn 2007). 
 34. This example is stylized.  Parts III.E and V, infra, discuss examples of official debt that mix 
commercial and political characteristics. 
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example, a ban on military sales) are already in place. On the other hand, the 
proposal to engage domestic-law doctrines does not apply to official creditors 
whose agreements are not enforced under domestic law.35 Moral appeals about 
apparent authority and loan-by-loan veil-piercing fit poorly in the wholesale 
political horse-trading environment where sovereign debtors come to settle up 
with other governments.36 
It is worthwhile at this stage to revisit the example of Iraq. Saddam Hussein 
foisted about $120 billion in defaulted sovereign debt on his successors. Of this 
total, about $100 billion was owed to other governments. Of that $100 billion, a 
little under $40 billion was the subject of an eighty percent debt reduction 
agreement negotiated with the personal involvement of Messrs. Bush, Putin, 
Chirac, and Schroeder in 2004.37 Debt relief is being implemented in stages, 
conditional on economic reform programs, to be completed in 2010. 
Negotiations over $60 billion claimed principally by governments in the Persian 
Gulf and Eastern Europe have produced minimal relief so far. In contrast, most 
of the roughly $20 billion owed to private creditors was exchanged for new 
bonds in late 2004, resulting in about eighty percent relief for that category of 
debt on the spot sans new doctrines.38 
The best of today’s proposals to refashion Odious Debt go to some portion 
of the last $20 billion. Of course, $20 billion is nothing to sneeze at. But a 
conversation about the $100 billion is long overdue. 
In sum, the doctrine of Odious Debt has had a hard time taking hold for 
many reasons, some but not all of which were apparent when it was first 
formulated. Since 1927, the doctrine of Odious Debt and the problem of odious 
debt have drifted further apart. One area where the gap has been particularly 
palpable is the growth of official sovereign debt, which the doctrine essentially 
ignores. The following section will explore this category of debt in more detail. 
 
 35. But see discussion of Donegal International v. Zambia, infra note 140, for an example of 
attempted enforcement of official debt by a private assignee. 
 36. See Miles Kahler, Politics and International Debt: Explaining the Crisis, in THE POLITICS OF 
INTERNATIONAL DEBT, supra note 28, at 16–22. For a more recent overview of official actors involved 
in sovereign-debt restructuring, see RIEFFEL, supra note 27 (Rieffel is a former Paris Club negotiator). 
For a lawyer’s perspective, see Lee C. Buchheit, The Role of the Official Sector in Sovereign Debt 
Workouts, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 333 (2005). States sometimes succeed in challenging the legitimacy of 
official debts; however, the resulting relief is couched in terms of economic necessity (as in the case of 
Vietnam, infra note 76). 
 37. See Paris Club, Iraq Debt Treatment, Nov. 21, 2004, http://www.clubdeparis.org/ 
sections/traitements/irak-20041121/viewLanguage/en (last visited May 5, 2007) for a summary of 
restructuring terms. See White House Press Release, President Discusses Year-End Accomplishments, 
(Dec. 11, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031211-1.html, on the 
high-level diplomacy. 
 38. International Monetary Fund, Iraq: Request for Stand-By Arrangement, IMF Country Report 
No. 06/15 at 69–70, (Jan. 2006), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2006/cr0615.pdf (last visited Jan. 
21, 2007). Some writers suggest that Iraq obtained such deep debt relief “in the shadow of Odious 
Debt”—under threat of its invocation. E.g., King, supra note 2; Jai Damle, Note, The Odious Debt 
Doctrine After Iraq, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming Autumn 2007). If true, this may say 
more about Odious Debt’s political salience than about its legal status, which remains untested. 
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III 
BETWEEN SOVEREIGN DEBT AND FOREIGN AID 
A. More Than Different Debtors 
This section begins with an overview of economic theories of sovereign debt, 
which serve as a departure point for the discussion of official lending. Like the 
doctrine of Odious Debt, these theories key off the relationship between a 
government debtor and private creditors, who are motivated above all by 
economic gain. The literature contrasts the relationship involving a sovereign 
with one in which both the debtor and the creditor are private. The big 
difference between sovereign and private debt is the sovereign debtor’s 
immunity from lawsuits (which has eroded since the 1950s)39 and the more 
practically salient and persistent limits on private creditor control over debtor 
behavior and assets to secure repayment.40 A related distinction stems from the 
fact that insolvent states have no recourse to a bankruptcy process that could 
give them meaningful financial relief and their creditors reasonable assurance 
of equitable treatment.41 
Where enforcement is hard, repudiation should be easy. In response, 
economists have asked why governments bother to repay and why creditors risk 
lending to borrowers who could so easily walk away. Their composite response 
is that governments repay in part because creditors can interfere with countries’ 
foreign commerce, pester them with lawsuits on the margins, refuse to make 
new loans, and tarnish borrower reputations.42 These constraints help explain 
why most states repay their debts most of the time; however, because sanctions 
are weak and indirect, the risk remains that any given sovereign borrower might 
default for lack of willingness (including political capacity) to pay. Because 
governments cannot credibly forswear repudiation in advance, creditors may 
 
 39. See, e.g., Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 613 (1992) (discussing the 
emergence of restrictive immunity for foreign governments in U.S. courts since the Tate Letter in 
1952). 
 40. Mitu Gulati & George Triantis, Contracts Without Law: Sovereign Versus Corporate Debt, 75 
U. CIN. L. REV. 977, 994–95 n.41 (2007) (discussing Citibank’s unsuccessful attempt to impose policy 
conditionality on Peru). 
 41. The literature addressing the lack of sovereign bankruptcy is voluminous. For an overview of 
critiques and modern-day proposals, see Kenneth Rogoff & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Banrkuptcy 
Procedures for Sovereigns: A History of Ideas, 1976-2001 (IMF, Working Paper No. 02/133, 2002), 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2002/wp02133.pdf. 
 42. See, e.g., FEDERICO STURZENEGGER & JEROMIN ZETTELMEYER, DEBT DEFAULTS AND 
LESSONS FROM A DECADE OF CRISES 31–47 (2007) (summarizing the literature); Jeremy Bulow & 
Kenneth Rogoff, Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget?, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 43, 46–47 (1989) 
(discussing enforcement); Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, Debt with Potential Repudiation: 
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 48 REV. ECON. STUD. 289, 289–90 (1981) (discussing reputation 
and market access); see also NOURIEL ROUBINI & BRAD SETSER, BAILOUTS OR BAIL-INS: 
RESPONDING TO FINANCIAL CRISES IN EMERGING ECONOMIES 305–06 (2004) (noting the importance 
of domestic constraints to the sovereign’s decision to repudiate). 
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ration lending.43 While they have market access, governments that expect to be 
shut off from credit may overborrow, overconsume, and overinvest in risky 
projects.44 Without a bankruptcy system, the parties may have trouble 
coordinating debt restructuring, which in turn may lead to runs, panics, and 
deadweight losses on all sides.45 
Although some elements of this theoretical framework apply to official 
lending, on the whole it is an awkward fit. The awkwardness has four essential 
dimensions. First, lending among governments is never at arm’s length and is 
rarely motivated by economic gain.46 Second, repudiation penalties are 
different. Since the emergence of large-scale official lending, governments have 
refrained as a rule from enforcing their loans in court. Arrears to official 
creditors appear to have limited impact on a country’s reputation with private 
creditors.47 Creditor governments threatened with default may refuse to lend,48 
insist on repayment, or agree to restructure—or better yet, they may simply 
lend the country its next coupon payment to avoid domestic implications of 
default for both governments.49 Third, in a country without private market 
access, official creditors as a group may exercise significant long-term policy 
control. A government with market access does not depend on, and need not 
answer to, official creditors to the same extent. A private debtor emerges from 
domestic bankruptcy substantially rid of its creditors or owned by them. In 
contrast, official debt-relief initiatives perpetuate debtor–creditor entanglement 
 
 43. Creditors worry about ex-post dilution, subordination, and default more with sovereign than 
with private debtors; as a result, they would lend less to sovereigns. See generally Bolton & Skeel, supra 
note 10; Carmen M. Reinhart, Kenneth S. Rogoff & Miguel A. Savastano, Debt Intolerance, 2003 
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 1 (2003); Jeffrey Sachs, Theoretical Issues in International 
Borrowing (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 1189, 1983), available at 
http://papers.nber.org/papers/w1189.v5.pdf; Patrick Bolton & Olivier Jeanne, Sovereign Debt 
Structuring and Restructuring: The Role of Seniority (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author). 
 44. Bolton & Jeanne, supra note 43; see also Bolton & Skeel, supra note 10; Reinhart et al., supra 
note 43. 
 45. Sachs et al., supra note 31. 
 46. See supra note 9. As discussed in the next subsection, even repayment is secondary in many 
cases. 
 47. Nigeria was in arrears to its official bilateral creditors for years but maintained access to private 
credit markets. Lex Rieffel, Nigeria’s Paris Club Debt Problem, Brookings Institution Policy Brief 144 
(Aug. 2005), available at http://www.brookings.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb144.pdf. Ironically, a major 
reason for Nigeria’s Paris Club arrears was the G7 countries’ refusal to negotiate a debt restructuring 
with General Sani Abacha, as well as Nigeria’s failure to comply with economic reform conditionality.  
See infra Part IV. Interest compounding accounts for Paris Club’s dominant share in Nigeria’s debt 
stock. Rieffel, supra. 
 48. See, e.g., Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 § 620(q), 22 U.S.C. 2370(q) (2000) (denying foreign 
assistance to countries in arrears on U.S. government loans subject to Presidential waiver authority, as 
well as the so-called Brooke or Brooke–Alexander Amendment in annual foreign operations 
appropriations bills, which denies assistance to governments and does not permit waivers); Foreign 
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Act 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-102, § 512, 119 Stat. 
2172 (2006). 
 49. For an example of official bilateral loans made to repay multilateral loans, see Jeremy Bulow, 
Kenneth Rogoff, & Afonso S. Bevilaqua., Official Creditor Seniority and Burden-Sharing in the Former 
Soviet Bloc, 1992 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 195, 218–19. 
05__GELPERN.DOC 12/6/2007  9:00:26 AM 
92 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 70:81 
for the poorest countries. Fourth and finally, creditor coordination is not a 
significant problem in official-debt restructuring. Official creditors are a small, 
tightly knit group; they have met regularly for decades and have developed a 
reasonably ritualized protocol for dealing with sovereign distress.50 
Literature about official debt (as distinct from sovereign debt in general) is 
not so much about debt as it is about debt relief.51 It addresses issues such as 
debt sustainability and the debt overhang (how much is too much and what 
happens when it happens),52 as well as conditionality (how to make sure relief is 
not wasted).53 There is a closely related literature on foreign assistance, which 
focuses on the effectiveness of government transfers in all forms, including 
debt.54 But like the writings on sovereign debt to private creditors, the relief and 
assistance genre does not address the significance of debt form, or examine the 
extent to which official debt is really debt. 
A series of papers by Bulow and Rogoff in the late 1980s and early 1990s is 
an important, albeit partial exception to the pattern.55 Written near the end of 
the Latin American debt crisis and at the start of large-scale lending to the 
former Soviet Bloc, these papers focus on the relationship between private and 
official-sector lending, and between official bilateral and multilateral lending to 
 
 50. RIEFFEL, supra note 27, at 56. Group dynamics may change with the rise of China, Venezuela, 
and other developing countries as creditors; however, the number of official creditors is limited by 
definition. 
 51. E.g., NANCY BIRDSALL & JOHN WILLIAMSON WITH BRIAN DEESE, DELIVERING ON DEBT 
RELIEF: FROM IMF GOLD TO A NEW AID ARCHITECTURE (2002). 
 52. See generally Jeffrey D. Sachs, The Debt Overhang of Developing Countries, in DEBT, 
STABILIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT 80 (Guillermo Calvo, Ronald Findlay, Pentti Kouri & Jorge 
Braga de Macedo eds., 1989); Paul Krugman, Financing vs. Forgiving a Debt Overhang, 29 J. DEV. 
ECON. 253 (1988). These articles do not specifically target official debt but include among their progeny 
recent writing addressing the debt problems of countries whose debt is overwhelmingly official. E.g., 
Jean Imbs & Roman Ranciere, The Overhang Hangover (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
3673, Aug. 2005), available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/wbk/wbrwps/3673.html; Nicolas Depetris Chauvin 
& Aart Kray, What Has 100 Billion Dollars Worth of Debt Relief Done for Low-Income Countries? 
(World Bank Working Paper, Sept. 2005), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ 
DEC/Resources/ChauvinKraayWhatHasDebtReliefAccomplishedSept2005.pdf; see also William 
Easterly, How Did Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Become Heavily Indebted?  Reviewing Two 
Decades of Debt Relief, 30 WORLD DEV. 1677 (2002). 
 53. See infra note 66 and accompanying text; Miles Kahler, External Influence, Conditionality, and 
the Politics of Adjustment, in STEPHAN HAGGARD & ROBERT R. KAUFMAN, THE POLITICS OF 
ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT (1992); Jeffrey D. Sachs, Conditionality, Debt Relief, and the Developing 
Country Debt Crisis, in DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBT AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 255 (Jeffrey 
D. Sachs ed., 1989). 
 54. E.g., Alberto Alesina & David Dollar, Who Gives Aid to Whom and Why?, 5 J. ECON. 
GROWTH 33 (1999); Craig Burnside & David Dollar, Aid, Policies, and Growth, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 
847 (2000); Dani Rodrik, Why Is There Multilateral Lending?, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1995 ANNUAL 
WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS (Michael Bruno & Boris Pleskovic eds., 
1996). 
 55. Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, The Buyback Boondoggle, 1988 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON 
ECON. ACTIVITY 675; Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, Multilateral Negotiations for Rescheduling 
Developing Country Debt: A Bargaining Theoretic Framework, 35 INT’L MONETARY FUND STAFF 
PAPERS 644 (1988); Bulow, Rogoff, & Bevilaqua, supra note 49. For an overview and update, see 
Jeremy Bulow, First World Governments and Third World Debt, 2002 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. 
ACTIVITY 229, 229–31. 
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middle-income countries. The authors suggest that official creditors as a group 
are functionally subordinate to private creditors, that official lending does not 
increase the borrowers’ overall repayment capacity, and therefore that official 
loans are an inefficient form of aid.56 This analysis goes both too far and not far 
enough. It reduces debt to the repayment obligation, reduces seniority to 
aggregate repayments over time, and limits the inquiry to cases in which private 
creditors are dominant.57 But what is the function of debt when improved 
repayment capacity is not the goal, when repayment itself is inessential, and 
when private creditors are marginal or absent altogether? Extending the 
Bulow–Rogoff argument, one might answer that such debt is financial air, a 
figment of political imagination. This view fails to explain the persistence of 
official debt despite decades of official debt-relief initiatives.58 Surely the debt 
form in official transfers must be useful to someone, especially if Bulow and 
Rogoff are right about its sorry track record of getting repaid. 
The remainder of this section elaborates on the distinctive attributes of 
official debt discussed in the preceding paragraphs, to situate official debt more 
precisely at the intersection of sovereign debt and foreign aid. 
B. Loans to Friends 
Large-scale official lending is a relatively new development. Sovereigns have 
occasionally borrowed from one another since the Middle Ages; however, such 
arrangements were the exception to the rule of borrowing from their own 
citizens, foreign bankers, and bondholders.59 Among the exceptions were U.S. 
loans to its World War I allies. Many of these ultimately went unpaid after 
repeated reschedulings; in the interim, they exacerbated allied pressure for 
German reparations.60 Another exception was export finance. Early in the 
twentieth century, several countries, including the United Kingdom, Germany, 
and the United States, established government and quasi-government agencies 
 
 56. The argument is strongest in Bulow, Rogoff & Bevilaqua, supra note 49. 
 57. For example, Bulow’s recent overview stipulates that “IFI debt is rarely very large.” Bulow, 
supra note 55, at 238. This assumption echoes O’Connell’s, made several decades earlier in the context 
of state succession. Supra note 29. It does not hold for poor countries. For example, at this writing, debt 
to the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) was the largest single category of debt for Liberia.  See 
supra note 7. 
 58. See RIEFFEL, supra note 27, at 56–94, 132–48, 178–87 for the history of official debt-relief 
initiatives.  See also BIRDSALL & WILLIAMSON, supra note 51. The latest major initiative was agreed at 
the G8 Summit in Gleneagles, Scotland, in 2005. Chair’s Summary, Gleneagles Summit (July 8, 2005), 
available at http://www.g8.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c= 
Page&cid=1119518698846; G8 Finance Ministers’ Conclusion on Development, London, (June 10–11, 
2005), available at http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/finance/fm050611_dev.htm. Most recently, official lending 
patterns have begun to shift: as G7 states and the multilaterals write off poor country debts, states like 
China are lending more. See, e.g., Todd Moss & Sarah Ross, China’s Export-Import Bank and Africa: 
New Lending, New Challenges, Center for Global Development Brief (Nov. 6, 2006), 
http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/11116/. 
 59. M. H. Hoeflich, Through a Glass Darkly: Reflections upon the History of International Law of 
Public Debt in Connection with State Succession, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 39–40 (1982). 
 60. Fishlow, supra note 28. 
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to promote national exports; these occasionally lent to importing governments.61 
The World War II Lend-Lease program financed shipments of supplies from 
the United States, primarily to the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R.62 
Exceptions aside, governments in capital-exporting countries participated in 
sovereign lending indirectly, by channeling and protecting their citizens’ 
financial adventures abroad.63 Private creditors were often encouraged to lend 
to their governments’ allies; lending to enemies was perilous. When sovereigns 
defaulted, bankers and bondholders appealed to their foreign ministries and 
occasionally persuaded their governments to intervene on their behalf legally, 
politically, and militarily.64 
The end of World War II ushered in a new political and economic order, 
and along with it a new model of sovereign financing. Since the wave of bond 
defaults in the 1930s, private debt markets remained closed to all but the most 
creditworthy countries. On the other hand, the idea that governments may 
properly intervene to counter market fluctuations was in ascendance.65 The 
World Bank was established to finance public reconstruction and development 
needs. Its charter barred the new bank from taking on private sector risk—it 
could lend only to governments or when backed by government guarantees.66 
More important for odious debt purposes, as the Cold War and anti-colonial 
struggles escalated, the governments of the United States, the Soviet Union, 
and other countries that could afford it began financing friendly governments 
directly on a large scale. New programs went beyond targeted military and 
export credits to encompass all manner of political, humanitarian, and 
economic development goals. A comprehensive U.S. foreign-assistance 
program was a landmark initiative of the Kennedy Administration, launched 
with the enactment of the Foreign Assistance Act of 196167 and the founding of 
 
 61. E.g., Ex-Im Bank History, http://www.exim.gov/news/reporter.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2007). 
 62. Lend-Lease terms were deeply subsidized.  Repayments were stretched over more than fifty 
years; interest accrued at two percent. The program was generally recognized as a matter of politics, not 
finance.  See, e.g., 637 PARL. DEB. H.L. (2002) 439, available at  http://www.publications.parliament.uk/ 
pa/ld200102/ldhansrd/vo020708/text/20708-03.htm#20708-03_head0 (last visited Aug. 16, 2007). 
 63. See Louis A. Pérez, Jr. & Deborah M. Weissman, Public Power and Private Purpose: Odious 
Debt and the Political Economy of Hegemony, 32 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. (forthcoming 2007), for 
a historical overview of government-sponsored private lending as political intervention in Latin 
America. 
 64. Tinoco Arbitration, supra note 22; FEILCHENFELD, supra note 18. In the past, creditor-country 
governments seized debtors’ customs houses to secure repayment for their nationals. See Ernst H. 
Feilchenfeld, Rights and Remedies of Holders of Foreign Bonds, in 2 SYLVESTER E. QUINDRY, BONDS 
& BONDHOLDERS: RIGHTS & REMEDIES § 666 (1934) (discussing intervention remedies available for 
foreign default); Fishlow, supra note 28, at 62–69 (discussing intervention remedies taken after the 
Barings crisis of 1890). 
 65. See generally THE POLITICAL POWER OF ECONOMIC IDEAS: KEYNESIANISM ACROSS 
NATIONS (Peter Hall ed., 1989). 
 66. World Bank, Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, art. III, sec. 4, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/Resources/ibrd-
articlesofagreement.pdf. 
 67. 22 U.S.C. § 2384 (2000). 
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the U.S. Agency for International Development.68 Much of the new money took 
the form of loans—a political accommodation with the perennially reluctant 
Congress. One participant in the debates of the day had this to say about the 
new lending: 
I think we are fooling ourselves and the world if we think that these loans are really 
going to be repaid. Indeed . . . [such] loans . . . tend in the very nature of the case to 
become disguised grants. . . . We have had experience with that sort of thing before. 
Witness First World War loans. The whole thing simply became unworkable. . . . Still, 
if grants are politically impossible, loans are far better than nothing. The problems of 
repayment will have to be dealt with in the future.69 
The passage above is seductively candid; it finds echoes in subsequent policy 
writing, debt-relief advocacy,70 and the more recent debates about 
reconstruction funding for Iraq.71 But to the extent it was meant or is taken to 
describe all official lending, or even all U.S. bilateral lending, it oversimplifies. 
Political expediency was an important reason, but not the only reason for 
choosing loans over grants. Some, but far from all loans were made without any 
expectation of repayment. And even when the expectation was attenuated or 
unreasonable, it seems premature to dub the transaction a grant when the 
donor’s legislature only authorized the funds on condition that the recipient 
promise to repay. 
Since 1961, the United States Congress has authorized scores of foreign loan 
initiatives to promote goals ranging from U.S. export growth, to East European 
democracy, to poverty reduction in Africa, to fighting disease in Asia, to 
propping up dictators in Latin America.72 Other governments established their 
own lending programs. Half a dozen major multilateral institutions joined the 
 
 68. For a history of USAID, see USAID, About USAID, http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/ (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2007). 
 69. ALVIN H. HANSEN, ECONOMIC ISSUES OF THE 1960S 128 (1960). 
 70. Do the Deal: The G7 Must Act Now to Cancel Poor Country Debts, Joint NGO Briefing Paper 
of Actionaid International, CAFOD and Oxfam International, at 6 (Dec. 2005), available at 
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/debt_aid/downloads/g7_deal.pdf; Treasury Secretary Paul 
H. O’Neill, Statement to the House Committee on Financial Services, May 22, 2001, available at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/po392.htm (“Grants are also more transparent than loans that are 
not likely to be repaid. If it is a grant we should call it a grant and not a loan.”); John B. Taylor, Grants 
and Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Two Key Elements of a Reform Agenda for the International 
Financial Institutions, Testimony before the Joint Economic Committee, Feb. 14, 2002, available at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/po1016.htm.  See generally Report of the International Financial 
Institution Advisory Commission (Mar. 2000), available at http://www.house.gov/jec/imf/meltzer.pdf 
[hereinafter Meltzer Report] for an influential example of debt-relief- and grant-financing advocacy 
from the right. 
 71. See, e.g., Jonathan Karl & Steve Turnham, Bush Wins Few GOP Senators on Iraq Money, Oct. 
15, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/10/15/sprj.nilaw.bush.congress.iraq/index.html (last 
visited Oct. 2, 2007). For a nuanced political economy analysis, see Eric Helleiner & Geoffrey 
Cameron, Commentary: Another World Order? The Bush Administration and HIPC Debt Cancellation, 
11 NEW POL. ECON. 125, 129–31 (2006). 
 72. STEVEN RADELET, CHALLENGING FOREIGN AID 2 (2003) (“[T]he US Foreign Assistance Act 
of 1961 . . . specifies a remarkable 33 goals, 75 priority areas, and 247 directives.”); see also United 
States Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan 
Authorizations July 1, 1945–September 30, 2004 (“The Green Book”), at iii-vi, 
http://qesdb.usaid.gov/gbk/index.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2007). 
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World Bank in lending long-term for economic development.73 These programs 
all have in common the recipients’ promise to repay. Beyond the promise, 
program design has varied widely, including direct budget contributions, project 
finance, commodity and military sales on credit, insurance, and guarantees. 
Some loans have “market-based” interest rates (usually calculated to recoup 
the lender’s costs);74 others are deeply subsidized (concessional). Legal 
documentation includes complex commercial contracts governed by New York 
law, much like the ones sovereigns sign with New York banks,75 patently 
political international agreements with no governing law or dispute-resolution 
provisions, and everything in between.76 Some loan recipients are creditworthy 
(China), others in desperate straights (Nicaragua); however, actual expectations 
of repayment are difficult to discern from credit quality since they are deeply 
entangled with the loan’s policy aims.77 
Related to repayment expectations, the subject of loan enforcement is also 
murky. Governments rarely if ever sue one another over money. At one end of 
the spectrum, bilateral loan agreements in areas such as budget support and 
 
 73. E.g., Inter-American Development Bank, http://www.iadb.org (last visited May 7, 2007); 
African Development Bank, http://www.afdb.org (last visited May 7, 2007); Asian Development Bank, 
http://www.adb.org (last visited May 7, 2007); European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
http://www.ebrd.org (last visited May 7, 2007); European Investment Bank, http://www.eib.europa.eu 
(last visited May 7, 2007); Islamic Development Bank, http://www.isdb.org (last visited May 7, 2007). 
 74. Wealthy governments and multilaterals typically borrow at lower cost than the governments to 
which they lend. For a government with a low credit rating, borrowing from official sources, even at 
market-based rates, can bring substantial savings. Some sovereigns cannot access private markets at any 
price—for them, the decision to borrow from the official sector is not driven by price. 
 75. U.S. Ex-Im Bank Model Loan Agreement (on file with author) [hereinafter Ex-Im Model]. 
 76. A well-publicized example of blatantly political foreign-assistance lending is the case of U.S. 
agricultural support for South Vietnam in the early 1970s. The agreements specifically allowed South 
Vietnam to monetize (sell) rice and tobacco shipments from the United States for “common defense” 
(to buy arms). See, e.g., Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam for Sales of Agricultural Commodities, 22 U.S.T. 1459, Sec. 
II.A.2 (June 28, 1971). The arrangement was apparently designed to allay U.S. congressional concerns 
about the Vietnam War. Although Socialist Vietnam subsequently agreed to pay virtually all other 
debts of the former Republic of Vietnam as part of a 1993 Paris Club rescheduling, it refused to pay 
these military debts disguised as food aid. Marian Nash (Leich), Contemporary Practice of the United 
States Relating to International Law, 91 AM. J. INT’L. L. 697, 705–06 (1997). Compare this to the 
discussion of war debts, supra text accompanying note 20. 
 77. Neither the fact that each loan includes an obligation to repay in full, nor that it is subject to the 
creditor’s domestic budget accounting rules to identify subsidy costs, is dispositive here. Full repayment 
obligations are frequently flouted or renegotiated. Budget accounting is another measure of the 
borrower’s creditworthiness, which is quite distinct from its willingness to pay and which says nothing 
of the creditor’s willingness to tolerate arrears. In the example of Vietnam cited earlier, the Legal 
Advisor to the U.S. Secretary of State issued an opinion to the effect that the disguised military loans 
were “uncollectible,” to enable the Executive Branch to write them off under existing Congressional 
authority. Considering that Vietnam promised to repay the bulk of its other debts, the determination 
must have been based on the U.S. assessment of Vietnam’s willingness to accept the obligations. See 
Nash, supra note 76. For an overview of relevant U.S. budget accounting rules and the Credit Reform 
Act of 1990, see James M. Bickley, Federal Credit Reform: Implementation of the Changed Budgetary 
Treatment of Direct Loans and Loan Guarantees, CRS Report  RL 30346, Congressional Research 
Service (June 23, 2003), available at http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs//data/2003/upl-meta-crs-
7706/RL30346_2003Jun23.pdf. Domestic budget accounting rules vary considerably among creditor 
governments. 
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military sales are secured by the bilateral political relationship.78 Legal 
enforcement is inconceivable in most such cases; however, an old promise to 
repay can complicate political transition. The festering dispute between Iraq 
and its Gulf neighbors over their funding of its war with Iran illustrates the 
point.79 The case against enforcement is harder to make for limited-purpose 
export finance transactions, especially considering their elaborate private-
sector-style documentation. However, even in such quasi-commercial loans, 
relationships loom large.80 Export finance commitments are regular 
“deliverables” at political summits. It is common knowledge that exporters’ 
governments look first to bilateral political channels to resolve disputes with the 
borrowing sovereign. It is significant that despite the U.S. Export-Import 
Bank’s long-standing practice of including U.S. governing law provisions in its 
sovereign contracts,81 there are no reported cases of Ex-Im suing a sovereign in 
U.S. courts.82 
Analyzing each subspecies of official lending in detail is beyond the scope of 
this article. However, several salient points emerge from the cursory survey in 
the preceding passages. First, to reiterate, none of the government loans are 
arm’s length in the traditional sense used to describe commercial transactions 
among independent economic actors. At some level all official loans, and 
especially bilateral ones, are extended in the name of the underlying political 
relationship and secured by it. Second, official transfers mix commercial and 
political attributes in very different ways; they range in formality, enforcement 
history, accounting treatment, use of proceeds, and actual expectation of 
repayment. Third, as discussed in detail below, virtually all official loans are 
premised on the expectation of policy performance by the debtor. 
 
 78. See supra Part III.A. 
 79. Iraq maintains the advances were grants extended to support a war against the common enemy; 
Gulf states insist they were loans. See, e.g., Susanna Mitchell, Jubilee Research Briefing on Debt in Iraq, 
Jubilee Research, Apr. 14, 2003, http://www.jubileeresearch.org/databank/Briefings/iraq170403.htm 
(attributing about half of Iraq’s debt burden to the disputed transactions). At this writing, Gulf claims 
are yet to be restructured, lagging far behind Iraq’s other debts. 
 80. For a historical overview of foreign-policy influences in U.S. export finance, see Rita M. 
Rodriguez, Exim’s Mission and Accomplishments: 1934-84, in THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK AT FIFTY: 
THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THE INSTITUTION’S ROLE 1, 6–10 (Rita M. Rodriguez ed., 
1987).  For a more recent perspective, see James A. Harmon, A Chairman’s Perspective on the Future of 
Ex-Im Bank, in The Ex-Im Bank in the 21st Century: A New Approach?, INST. FOR INT’L ECON. SPEC. 
REP. 14, at 35, 43 (Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Rita M. Rodriguez eds., Jan. 2001). For a comparison 
between U.S. and Japanese export finance politics, see Peter C. Evans & Kenneth A. Oye, International 
Competition in Government Export Financing, in INST. FOR INT’L ECON. SPEC. REP., supra at 113, 125. 
Middle-income countries such as China, Romania, or Venezuela may be more likely to regard 
government-to-government transactions as a source of revenue rather than, or in addition to, a source 
of influence. 
 81. Initially District of Columbia, changed to New York in the 1990s. Ex-Im Model, supra note 75, 
and Additional Terms and Conditions with Respect to Amounts Owing to Eximbank, in Agreement 
Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of 
Poland regarding the Reduction and Reorganization of Certain Debts (1991) (on file with author). 
 82. Ex-Im is more likely to sue private-sector borrowers. E.g., Export-Import Bank of the United 
States v. Asia Pulp & Paper Co., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8902 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2005). 
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C. Commitment and Control 
Private lenders to risky countries are in it for the money. They want to get 
out as soon as possible with as much money as possible.83 In contrast, official 
lenders often want to stay in as long as possible, even as they seek to minimize 
the cost of engagement. For governments financing other governments, policy 
influence is a central objective, regardless of the form the transfer takes. The 
object of such influence may be entirely altruistic (hunger relief) or unsavory 
(suppressing political opposition). Conditionality is the mechanism by which the 
transferor obtains specific policy concessions from the transferee. Broadly 
defined, it includes eligibility criteria and conditions precedent, as well as 
promises of policy performance following loan disbursement. Some form of 
conditionality is common to all official lending (buying donor exports, fortifying 
insurgents, building schools for girls). It is also the subject of a large literature.84 
Policy conditionality has been criticized as means for rich countries to 
control the poor.85 But conditionality is also an intuitive response to the 
principal–agent problems in foreign assistance.86 Voters in donor countries 
(principals) want influence over how their own and the recipient governments 
(agents) spend their tax money. Donor legislatures can exercise such influence, 
for example, by demanding environmental assessments in aid-funded projects 
or by banning talk of abortions in aid-funded clinics. Beneficiaries in recipient 
countries (the people, principal) may welcome externally imposed 
conditionality with respect to human rights, budget transparency, and civil-
society involvement, especially to the extent it helps control incompetent or 
corrupt rulers (agent). But even where the beneficiaries might welcome them, 
conditions are usually written and enforced by lender constituencies. 
The link between debt form and conditionality is not straightforward. 
Sovereign-debt theories often stipulate that conditionality is an attribute of debt 
form.87 In this view, conditional loans are the opposite of unconditional gifts, or 
 
 83. The phenomenon of relationship lending by private institutions—for example, arranging 
sovereign loans for the sake of future investment banking business or a local franchise—complicates, 
but does not negate this characterization. A private lender may take on more risk for a lower price than 
it might have in the absence of relationship considerations, but the transaction or set of transactions is 
still structured to make as much money as possible under the circumstances. 
 84. For early treatments, see Kahler, supra note 53, and Sachs, supra note 53. 
 85. For an influential NGO perspective, see Fifty Years is Enough, SAPS: The IMF, the World 
Bank, and Structural Adjustment (Mar. 2004), http://www.50years.org/factsheets/SAPs-FactSheet_ 
3.9.04.pdf. For a critical scholarly analysis of the policy influence process, see NGAIRE WOODS, THE 
GLOBALIZERS: THE IMF, THE WORLD BANK AND THEIR BORROWERS 65–83 (2006). 
 86. Kahler, supra note 53; Bertin Martens, Why Do Aid Agencies Exist?, 23 DEV. POL’Y REV. 643 
(2005); see also Merilee S. Grindle, In Quest of the Political, in GERALD M. MEIER & JOSEPH E. 
STIGLITZ, FRONTIERS OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS: THE FUTURE IN PERSPECTIVE 364–67 (2001). 
Compare with discussions of agency problems of the people–rulers variety in sovereign debt in 
Buchheit et al., supra note 1, at 1237–45, and Robert K. Rasmussen, Integrating a Theory of the State 
into Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1159, 1177 (2004). 
 87. E.g., Sachs, supra note 53. Sachs’s own paper implicitly defeats the premise that loans are 
justified by conditionality. After demonstrating that IMF policy conditions are rarely enforced, he 
proposes an emphasis on “prior actions”—securing performance before money is disbursed.  Id. This 
05__GELPERN.DOC 12/6/2007  9:00:26 AM 
Summer 2007] ODIOUS, NOT DEBT 99 
grants. But it is possible to have enforceable conditionality without requiring 
repayment—development policy trends now favor grants that require policy 
performance before disbursement.88 The loan form adds post-disbursement 
conditionality: donors pre-commit by advancing the loan proceeds, thereby 
acquiring the right and incentive to monitor future performance; recipients 
promise to repay and submit to donor monitoring of their policies.89 From this 
perspective, policy conditions appear formally analogous to operational 
covenants in private-debt contracts.90 But conditionality serves a distinct 
purpose in official lending. Whereas in private-debt contracts, covenants go 
above all to improving the prospects of repayment, in official lending, policy 
promises often are the principal rationale for the loan; the repayment promise is 
a vehicle to secure policy performance (which may also improve the prospects 
of repayment).91 
For lending governments, the debt form has a domestic political function 
and a foreign-policy function.92 The promise to repay tells domestic 
 
makes loans functionally indistinguishable from conditional grants, since the continuing repayment 
obligation adds little for policy performance. 
 88. E.g., U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation, Fact Sheet, http://www.mcc.gov/selection/ 
1006_Fact_Sheet_Selection_Process.pdf; see RADELET, supra note 72; Bulow, supra note 56; Sachs et 
al., supra note 31; Taylor, supra note 70; Meltzer Report, supra note 70 (advocating conditional grants; 
“prior actions” are an established analogue in IFI lending). 
 89. The commitment embedded in a debt instrument need not be one-sided. If sovereign-debt 
theories are right about the weak nonpayment sanction, at least in some cases, the loan form may do 
more to bind the official donor than it would the sovereign recipient. For example, small, poor 
borrowers may be able to leverage the loan form at the margins to engage rich countries’ policy 
attention. As noted earlier, these countries depend on net transfers from a small group of donors. The 
same level of net transfers can result from new loans large enough to service the old ones plus meet the 
new needs, or full debt relief plus grants sufficient to meet the new needs. The form of the transfers 
does not change the basic fact that the borrower needs new money and can only get it from a handful of 
governments and organizations. When the transfers are in grant form, the grantor can walk away from 
the relationship at any point, for example, when money is tight and the poor country is strategically 
unimportant. With loans, a borrower might gain incremental leverage by threatening default. A recent 
U.K.-led initiative to “commit” donors to grant aid ten years forward through dedicated market 
borrowing illustrates the challenge. Gordon Brown, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer, International 
Development in 2005: The Challenge and the Opportunity, Speech at the National Gallery of Scotland 
(Jan. 6, 2005), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/newsroom_and_speeches/press/2005/ 
press_03_05.cfm. Here again, the debt form serves as a commitment device—binding donor 
governments by recasting them as borrowers. Donor governments presumably stand to lose more than 
aid recipients from defaulting on market borrowing, since unlike most aid recipients, they tap the 
markets routinely for essential financing needs. 
 90. BRATTON, supra note 9, at 209–32. 
 91. Kahler, supra note 53; see also Bruno, supra note 82, at 229–30 (“It is hard to envisage an 
institution such as the IMF or IBRD as being effective in promoting or supporting a country’s . . .  
reform agenda where it not also a creditor itself to the country in question . . . In particular, a mutual 
benefit exists to having an ongoing process of loan surveillance; this would account for the 
preponderance of loans, rather than grants.”). 
 92. The domestic function is common knowledge in the policy circles. The comments on Bulow, 
Rogoff & Bevilaqua, supra note 49, from participants in the Brookings Institution conference where 
they presented their paper, are revealing. See comments by Michael Bruno (“As to the issue of why the 
IFIs should extend loans, rather than simply grants, sufficient reasons exist—both economic and 
politico-economic, most of which are internal to the creditor countries.”) and Lewis Alexander 
(“Alexander added that it is politically easier for donor countries to provide assistance through loans, 
rather than through grants.”). Bulow, Rogoff & Bevilaqua, supra note 49, at 230, 233. 
05__GELPERN.DOC 12/6/2007  9:00:26 AM 
100 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 70:81 
constituencies that their government is not giving away tax money and reduces 
the appearance of subsidy. It also suggests that the creditors have a way to 
monitor the use of loan proceeds over time and get the money back if anything 
goes awry.  On the foreign-policy front, where the loan is an outgrowth of the 
political relationship, the principal value of a repayment obligation to the 
creditor may be neither legal nor financial, but instead may lie in its capacity to 
entrench the relationship.93 At home and abroad, an official loan is a long-term 
commitment device. 
In sum, the obligation to repay adds or reinforces a long-term, relational 
element in official transfers. Supporters and opponents of official lending are 
well aware of this.  A former World Bank official observed that “loans 
established a desirable ongoing relationship between borrower and lender in a 
way that grants do not.”94  This mirrors the views of NGO critics, minus the 
enthusiasm: “Debt is a political instrument, one that traps countries in the snare 
of conditions and never lets go.”95 
D. No Fresh Start 
The peculiar workings of policy conditionality appear starkly in the context 
of debt relief for the poorest countries. These are countries where people live 
on less than two dollars a day, which have no market access and depend on a 
small group of official creditors to make ends meet. The donors—members of 
the Paris Club of official creditors and the multilateral institutions they control 
(all long-time repeat players)—coordinate the provision of needs-based 
financial relief to restore countries to “sustainable” levels of external 
indebtedness. Debt relief is conditional on policy performance (usually in 
conjunction with an economic program agreed to by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF)).96 Thanks to serial debt rescheduling, a dollar lent in 
Cold War friendship in 1970 might be effectively recycled many times subject to 
new conditions du jour—privatization in the 1980s, financial liberalization in the 
1990s, poverty relief in the 2000s. The result is a loss of policy autonomy, and 
 
 93. The relationship may be unbalanced, but it is not entirely one-sided.  Woods’ formulation is 
revealing: 
Having extended loans to African countries throughout the 1960s and 1970s for a variety of 
geostrategic, postcolonial, economic, and domestic political reasons, the industrialized 
countries found themselves in relationships with aid-dependent states that could not repay 
even the most concessional loans.  They turned to the IMF and World Bank for help and the 
institutions duly became more active in Africa. 
 Woods, supra note 87, at 146. 
 94. Bulow, Rogoff & Bevilaqua, supra note 81, at 233 (comments by Stanley Fischer).  Fischer was 
Chief Economist at the World Bank shortly before making the comment; he later served as the First 
Deputy Managing Director of the IMF. 
 95. Soren Ambrose, Assessing the G8 Debt Proposal & Its Implications, Sept. 21, 2005, 
http://www.50years.org/cms/updates/story/270 (last visited Oct. 2, 2007). 
 96. See, e.g., Nigeria’s Debts: No Longer Unforgivable, ECONOMIST, Mar. 17, 2005 (arguing for 
conditional relief), available at http://www.cgdev.org/doc/Nigeria_economist.pdf. In the final analysis, 
Nigeria’s Paris Club deal had unusually weak conditionality. Rieffel, supra note 47. 
05__GELPERN.DOC 12/6/2007  9:00:26 AM 
Summer 2007] ODIOUS, NOT DEBT 101 
with it, domestic policy capacity.97 Middle-income countries with market access 
may retain policy autonomy by playing creditor constituencies off one another, 
or may regain it by repaying official creditors under favorable market 
conditions.98 Poor countries that depend on official creditors rarely have this 
option.99 
Debt-relief advocates are conflicted over conditionality. Some like Sachs 
openly embrace G7 policy leverage and seek to influence program content;100 
others demand unconditional relief but cite the experience of conditional relief 
programs to argue that debt reduction has funded health and education 
spending.101 
In addition to conditionality, two other features of the official debt-
restructuring process are worth flagging. First, Paris Club terms rarely if ever 
emerge from a two-way bespoke negotiation between a debtor and its creditors. 
Instead, creditors periodically announce a coordinated debt-relief initiative; 
debtors present their case for eligibility and argue for relief based on a menu of 
standard scenarios. That Paris Club restructuring terms are named after the G7 
summits where they were announced is telling: the debtors were marginal 
players in creditor designs on their behalf.102 Borrowing governments also 
 
 97. Cf. Stephen Knack, Aid Dependence and the Quality of Governance: A Cross-Country 
Empirical Analysis (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper WPS2396, 2000), available at 
http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/research/workpapers.nsf/0/30529397228d0a778525691c006768c7/$FILE/
wps2396.pdf (suggesting that countries that depend on conditional transfers lose governance capacity). 
Even the best-run government in a very poor country must devote inordinate resources to managing 
donor priorities rather than governing. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND INDEPENDENT 
EVALUATION OFFICE, EVALUATION OF THE IMF’S ROLE IN POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGY 
PAPERS AND THE POVERTY REDUCTION AND GROWTH FACILITY 23 (2004), http://www.imf.org/ 
External/NP/ieo/2004/prspprgf/eng/report.pdf (describing tensions inherent in designing policy 
programs linked to the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative). On the other hand, as 
discussed earlier, conditionality is a way to secure accountability in foreign assistance. 
 98. See, e.g., Remarks by Deputy Managing Director, Murilo Portugal at a Debt Managers 
Conference, International Monetary Fund, Cairo, Egypt, Feb. 8, 2007, http://www.imf.org/external/ 
np/speeches/2007/020807.htm (citing examples of governments that have prepaid their debt to the IMF 
under favorable capital markets conditions). For a recent study arguing that market access is consistent 
with policy autonomy, see Giselle Datz, Global-National Interactions and Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Outcomes, in DECIPHERING THE GLOBAL 324, 336–37 (Saskia Sassen ed., 2007). 
 99. They may switch among official creditors; however, this merely substitutes one donor 
government’s policy goals for another’s. Most recently, many African states have secured deep debt 
relief from the G7 and multilateral institutions; they promptly proceeded to borrow from China. Geoff 
Lamb, Aid, Africa and Fear of Another Borrowing Binge, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 2, 2006 at 17. 
Although Lamb and others have described China’s financing as unconditional, it is more accurate to 
say that China’s conditions are different. See Lex Rieffel, Why Bad Loans Are Good for Africa, 
GLOBALIST, Feb. 13, 2007, http://www.theglobalist.com/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=5970, for a different 
perspective on the same phenomenon. 
 100. Jeffrey Sachs, The G8 Must Fund the War Against Poverty, FIN. TIMES (London), June 7, 2004, 
at 17. 
 101. Do the Deal, supra note 70. Truly unconditional debt relief, like unconditional aid, leaves 
spending decisions entirely up to the recipient government. It privileges recipient autonomy over donor 
policy priorities, even where autonomy yields marble fountains over school lunches. 
 102. RIEFFEL, supra note 27, at 67, 72 n.25; Int’l Monetary Fund, From Toronto Terms to the HIPC 
Initiative: A Brief History of Debt Relief for Low-Income Countries (IMF Working Paper WP/99/142, 
Oct. 1999), available at http://www.internationalmonetaryfund.com/external/pubs/ft/wp/1999/ 
wp99142.pdf.  A recent Paris Club initiative named after the 2003 G7 Summit locale attempts to loosen 
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seemed to take the back seat to G7 powers and even civil-society groups in 
recent multilateral debt-cancellation initiatives. Here debt relief became a 
medium for negotiating the institutional architecture for aid delivery among 
donors and their constituents.103 Aid recipients did not belong in these 
negotiations. 
Second, Paris Club members require as a condition of restructuring that the 
debtor seek “comparable treatment” from all other creditors.104 The goal of 
comparability is to avoid subsidizing the debtor’s concessions to other creditors. 
Although club members have no way to enforce the requirement against 
nonparticipating creditors (their agreement is with the debtor) and have 
interpreted it with some flexibility, the overall effect of comparability practice is 
to promote similar treatment across categories of sovereign debt, following the 
terms established in the first instance by the official creditors among 
themselves.105 
In sum, successive layers of conditionality, creditor control over the 
restructuring process, and comparability come together in official debt relief to 
deepen and perpetuate, rather than sever, the underlying relationship. The next 
subsection begins to situate these and other attributes of official debt in the 
broader debates about what is debt. 
E. From Pole to Spectrum 
The discussion so far suggests that official debt does not look much like 
arm’s length commercial debt. Governments do not lend to make money. 
 
the rigid formula-based approach of the traditional terms menu. The Paris Club, Evian Approach, 
http://www.clubdeparis.org/sections/termes-de-traitement/approche-d-evian. Compare Backer, supra 
note 19: “[F]orgiveness . . . provides a means for creditor states to retain power to control forgiveness, 
so that it remains an extraordinary act controlled wholly by creditor states.” Compare Norway’s 
unilateral debt-forgiveness initiative, infra note 130 and accompanying text. 
 103. See Helleiner & Cameron, supra note 71, at 131–36 (discussing differences between U.S. and 
U.K strategies for funding multilateral debt relief). Some U.S. proposals would have the effect of 
shrinking multilateral development institutions, reflecting a preference for bilateral channels. See also 
Meltzer Report, supra note 70, and BIRDSALL & WILLIAMSON, supra note 51, for influential 
discussions of the relationship between aid and debt relief. 
 104. A typical clause in the Paris Club Agreed Minute reads as follows: 
In order to secure comparable treatment of its debt due to all its external public or private 
creditors, [the country] commits itself to seek promptly from all its external creditors debt 
reorganization arrangements on terms comparable to those set forth in the present Agreed 
Minute, while trying to avoid discrimination among different categories of creditors. 
Paris Club, Georgia Debt Treatment, July 21, 2004, http://www.clubdeparis.org/sections/ 
traitements/georgie-20040721. See Paris Club, Rules and Principles—Comparability of Treatment, 
http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/presentation/presentation .php?BATCH=B01WP06 (last visited Jan. 21, 
2007). For criticism of the principle’s application to bonds, see Brian Caplen, Sovereign Bonds: Logic 
Does Not Apply, EUROMONEY, June 1999, at 17. Rieffel writes that before 1996, agreements 
distinguished between nonparticipating official and private creditors.  RIEFFEL, supra note 27, at 75. 
 105. RIEFFEL, supra note 27, at 280–86. Note that in recent cases, comparability has run in one 
direction. Normally, the Paris Club restructures first and demands comparability in later deals with 
nonparticipating creditors. Ecuador’s private creditors went first and tried to extract “reverse 
comparability” from the Paris Club. The Club rejected the argument and proceeded to restructure 
under its conventional formulas. Jorge Gallardo, Cracks in the New Financial Architecture, 
EUROMONEY, Apr. 1, 2001, at 50. 
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Enforcement is indirect and the expectation of repayment may be attenuated. 
The lender’s best repayment guarantee may reside in the survival and continued 
prosperity of the borrowing government and in the political relationship itself. 
Lending governments use conditionality as a vehicle to advance their 
substantive policy goals, to enhance accountability on the part of the recipient 
government, and to justify aid transfers to domestic audiences. Debt relief does 
not end, but perpetuates the debtor–creditor relationship and increases creditor 
control. 
This set of attributes has no easy counterpart in private commerce.106 For 
countries that depend on official sources of finance, wide-ranging policy 
conditionality resembles management control traditionally associated with 
equity-like instruments in corporate finance. That repayment is a function of 
recipients’ economic and political fortunes similarly evokes equity. But creditor 
control in sovereign-debt restructuring also has parallels in recent domestic 
corporate-debt practice (for example, creditors taking operational control of an 
insolvent enterprise).107 The difference with the poorest countries is that assets 
do not change hands, and control continues long after debt relief is granted, 
creating something akin to permanent receivership. Yet another analogy is to 
structured finance. In this view, the borrowing government sells limited policy 
cooperation; the lending government takes this “asset” along with the risk of 
regime change.108 
In these domestic fields and others, “debt” marks one end of a spectrum (as 
in debt-grant, debt-equity, debt-sale), where the debt end is associated with the 
highest repayment priority. At the other end, each pairing emphasizes a 
different set of attributes. With grants, it may be charity and donor discretion, 
with equity, operational control, with sale, ownership and risk transfer. But a 
 
 106. See supra note 81 (distinguishing “relationship lending” by private institutions (still profit-
driven over the life of the relationship)). Domestic lending by governments holds few lessons for 
government-to-government lending in part because the lines of legal authority are clearly drawn in the 
domestic context, but are absent or confused in a world of formally equal sovereign states. See generally 
Daniel K. Tarullo, Rules, Discretion, and Authority in International Financial Reform, J. INT’L ECON. L. 
613 (2001). 
 107. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 673 
(2003); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Control Rights, Priority Rights, and the Conceptual 
Foundations of Corporate Reorganizations, 87 VA. L. REV. 921 (2001); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The 
Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 795 (2004); Lynn M. LoPucki, A Team Production 
Theory of Bankruptcy Reorganization (UCLA School of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, 
Paper No. 03-12, Apr. 23, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=397801. 
 108. For a discussion of asset-backed financing structures and the distinction between debt and 
“true sale,” see Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 133 
(1994). This analogy is attractive because it helps isolate the real value for which the public lender 
contracts. It could also end any presumption in favor of succession with respect to official debt. Cf. 
O’CONNELL, supra note 18 and accompanying text (on “political” obligations not subject to 
succession). A related analogy is the distinction between a true lease and secured financing. See U.C.C. 
§  1-203 (2004). 
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given set of facts can be a matter of more-or-less, not either–or—for example, 
more control, less repayment priority, hence more equity, less debt.109 
The attributes of official debt discussed so far are present in all forms of 
official lending; however, the mix of official and commercial aspects is different 
across instruments.110 Even if no category of official debt could meet the 
traditional definition of arm’s length commercial debt, some categories may get 
closer than others. For example, an export credit extended to build a road, 
where conditionality is narrowly drawn, the borrower is creditworthy, and the 
transaction is documented under an apparently enforceable debt contract, looks 
more like arm’s length commercial debt than does a shipment of rice monetized 
to finance ongoing military operations by a government fighting for its life, and 
more so than a budget-support package to an overindebted government 
conditioned on a broad range of economic and political reforms only vaguely 
related to repayment. It appears that official obligations, like private ones, fall 
along a continuum reflecting the substantive content of the transaction, 
including such factors as purpose, the creditors’ repayment expectations, and 
the extent of creditors’ operational control. The prevailing loan–grant- and 
succession–repudiation frameworks are much too binary to be useful—they 
obscure the substance of the underlying economic and political relationships. 
The following section addresses some consequences of this point. 
IV 
TAR, FEATHER, SUBORDINATE 
If one were to describe an official loan in generic terms, it might be as a 
transfer of money in exchange for some degree of policy control over the 
borrower and the borrower’s promise to repay, where the repayment 
expectation may be attenuated and the repayment prospects are tied to the 
borrowing government’s fortunes, as well as to the quality of the political 
relationship between the debtor and the creditor. It is an animal unknown to 
international law, and unacknowledged in sovereign-debt practice. 
As noted at the start of this article, international law governing succession is 
essentially black and white. Debt obligations are apportioned at face value or 
fail entirely.111 Once it is established that the successor state owes the money, it 
 
 109. See, e.g., Georgette C. Poindexter, Dequity: The Blurring of Debt and Equity in Securitized Real 
Estate Financing, 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 233 (2005). 
 110. See supra notes 73–81 and accompanying text. 
 111. The distinction here is between apportionment (or repartition) of full face value among 
successor states and payment priority. It is further elaborated below. On apportionment, see 
O’CONNELL, supra note 18, at 454–56; SACK, supra note 18. Although state practice has varied, the 
presumption in favor of apportionment has been strongest where the debt has a connection to the 
territory changing hands (local or localized debts, incurred by the locality in its own name or by the 
ceding government for projects in the locality). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 209(2). The Convention on the Succession of States in 
Respect of State Property, Archives and State Debts was opened for signature in 1983, but has not 
entered into force. It favors equitable apportionment of financial obligations, taking into account the 
apportionment of state property, but advocating a clean slate for post-colonial states. See Economic 
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may invoke Paris Club practice and request debt relief on financial grounds. In 
a sovereign workout, an obligation in the form of an “IOU” is presumptively 
senior, unsecured, unsubordinated indebtedness of the sovereign ranking pari 
passu with all other public and private debts.112 Although IOUs to multilateral 
creditors are formally part of this category, they have enjoyed a blanket 
exemption from restructuring for most of their history. 
In contrast, domestic debtor–creditor law is used to dealing with a wide 
variety of financial instruments that are neither senior nor void. Such 
obligations retain repayment rights but are lower down in priority of 
distribution.113 Against the background of priority, U.S. law has developed ways 
of managing claims whose form does not reflect their substance, as well as 
claims for which creditor misbehavior may warrant a loss of priority otherwise 
inherent in the instrument. 
For example, when the form of a transaction does not reflect its substance, 
the bankruptcy doctrine of recharacterization allows courts to use equitable 
powers under section 105 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code to treat debt as equity. 114 
When creditor misbehavior is an issue, a court may demote a claim in 
distribution priority, including under section 510(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, to 
the extent necessary to remedy harm to other creditors and the estate.115 Both 
doctrines are used to punish corporate insiders for entering into non-arm’s 
length transactions to the detriment of others.116 Applying each of the two 
doctrines often leads to the same result—the offending claim is subordinated 
and goes unpaid. However, recharacterization and equitable subordination are 
 
Aspects of State Succession: Final Report, International Law Association Toronto Conference (2006) 
Aspects of the Law of State Succession. Sack took a more extreme position, accepting territory as 
proxy for assets available to repay state debts, with liabilities generally following the assets when 
territory changed hands.  SACK, supra note 18, at 13–18. Compare a leading incident cited in support of 
the Odious Debt doctrine, involving the U.S. refusal to let Cuba assume Spanish debts secured by 
Cuban revenues. The United States claimed that linking debt so closely to territorial succession would 
make it tantamount to a mortgage, which it was not, and in any event, that proceeds from the 
obligations at issue were used to oppress the Cubans.  See FEILCHENFELD, supra note 18 (describing 
debt negotiations following the Spanish-American War).  See King, supra note 2, at 31–32, for an 
example of how the incident is used traditionally in the Odious Debt literature. Perez & Weissman, 
supra note 63, at 23, offer a more critical treatment. 
 112. See supra note 10. 
 113. E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 507 (2000); BRATTON, supra note 11; Carlson, supra note 12. 
 114. 11 U.S.C. § 105 (2000).  For a recent analysis of the recharacterization doctrine, see David A. 
Skeel, Jr. & George Krause-Vilmar, Recharacterization and the Nonhindrance of Creditors, 7 EUR. 
BUS. ORG. L. REV. 259 (2006). 
 115. 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (2000). Carlson offers the most elaborate treatment of equitable 
subordination outside bankruptcy; Feibelman applies the expanded analysis to sovereign debt owed to 
private creditors. See Carlson, supra note 12; Feibelman, supra note 33. 
 116. The inquiry is whether the transaction “carries the earmarks of an arm’s length bargain.” 
Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306–07 (1939). See Keriann M. Atencio, Recommending Turnaround 
Managers: Ensuring that a Good Deed Goes Unpunished, 23-10 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 44 (Dec. 2004), 
for a discussion of factors courts consider in drawing the boundary for control or insider conduct for 
purposes of subordination. 
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analytically distinct;117 each contains elements important to the odious debt 
debate. 
Recharacterization is the more controversial of the two doctrines. Although 
a majority of courts have concluded that their equitable powers in bankruptcy 
permit recharacterization, some have not.118 Those courts that have shown a 
willingness to recharacterize have created complex (eleven- and thirteen-part) 
tests to ground what appear to be one-off, fact-based determinations.119 Factors 
include debt form, sources and expectation of repayment, the nature and extent 
of benefit for the debtor, creditor control over the borrowing firm, and others 
going to the arm’s length quality of the transaction. But courts have emphasized 
that none of the tests is mechanical: their purpose is to guide detailed factual 
inquiry into whether the claimant acted as a “banker” or an “investor”120 but 
avoid condemning entire categories of transactions that courts might consider 
unfair. Rather, courts purport to isolate instances in which the gap between 
legal form and economic substance is so wide that allowing form to prevail 
would be inequitable. Recharacterization does not require a bad act on the part 
of the creditor, though recharacterized claims are often an unsavory lot.121 
In contrast, courts have generally held that equitable subordination requires 
a wrongdoing. It is a remedy, not a classification device, and may be invoked 
only in response to a creditor’s inequitable conduct and under section 510(c). 
The subordination remedy must be proportional to the injury from such 
conduct; recharacterization simply treats debt as equity.  Courts generally 
require the following three elements to subordinate in bankruptcy: (1) 
inequitable conduct by the creditor (2) leading to harm for other creditors or 
 
 117. See In re Submicron, 432 F.3d 438 (3d Cir. 2006) (discussing the difference between the two 
doctrines); Bruce H. White & William L. Medford, Debt-to-Equity Recharacterization: Is It More than 
Equitable Subordination’s Evil Twin?, 23–9 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 26 (Nov. 2004). 
 118. Concern is reordering Bankruptcy Code priorities based on general notions of equitable 
distribution, beyond the framework of sec. 510 remedies. See Klee & Mervis, Recharacterization in 
Bankruptcy, in BUSINESS REORGANIZATION AND BANKRUPTCY; see also In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc. 
269 F.3d 726 (6th Cir. 2001) (permitting recharacterization); In re Pacific Express, Inc., 69 B.R. 112, 115 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986) (recharacterization is beyond the scope of Bankruptcy Code Sec. 105). 
 119. Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 800 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1986); In re 
Autostyle Plastics, 269 F.3d 726, 749–50 (6th Cir. 2001); In re Cold Harbor Associates L.P., 204 B.R. 
904 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997); see also Klee & Mervis, supra note 118, at 589–90. 
 120. In re Submicron, supra note 117. See JoAnn J. Brighton, Submicron Developments in 
Recharacterization: Certainty and Finality, or Further Confusion?, 25-3 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 28 (Apr. 
2006). Skeel and Krause-Vilmar suggest that many of the elements the courts use as grounds for 
recharacterization address the concern that bona fide creditors might be mislead about the existence of 
a debt to the insider because it lacks the formal attributes of arm’s length debt. Skeel & Krause-Vilmar, 
supra note 115, at 268–69, 276–79. 
 121. See, for example, In re Hoffinger Industries, Inc., 327 B.R. 389 (E.D. Ark. 2005), in which a 
swimming-pool manufacturer created a series of sham financial entities and transactions to make the 
pool company judgment-proof in the face of a tort action. A seminal case for the early development of 
both recharacterization and equitable subordination involved a parent corporation (Standard Gas & 
Electric) making a series of loans and charges to a severely undercapitalized subsidiary (Deep Rock 
Oil), which, if honored, would have put the parent ahead of the preferred stockholders in Deep Rock’s 
bankruptcy.  Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric, 306 U.S. 307 (1939). 
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the estate or unfair advantage for the creditor, and (3) the subordination 
remedy is not inconsistent with other provisions of the bankruptcy code.122 
Like recharacterization, the equitable-subordination remedy is granted most 
often against insiders. When the claimant is not an insider, courts require 
additional evidence of inequitable conduct, such as fraud.123 However, when 
inequitable or insider conduct causes no harm and brings no unfair advantage, 
there is no cause for the remedy. Courts have even sought to protect some 
instances of insider lending as necessary to the firm’s survival. 
The contrast with sovereign practice is illuminating. Both corporate and 
sovereign borrowers have diverse obligations that range along a continuum in 
repayment expectations, control rights, and other substantive features. In the 
corporate world, this diversity is recognized and reflected in payment priority. 
In the sovereign world, this diversity is formally denied and practically 
accommodated through a patchwork of ad hoc restructuring arrangements. In 
the case of corporate debt, courts have used equitable powers to ensure that the 
transaction’s form and substance roughly coincide, and to penalize creditors for 
inequitable behavior. Sovereign-debt practice has no similar function.124 
Quintessential insider lending, such as bilateral official credits to prop up 
puppet regimes, is treated on par with arm’s length financing. 
The result is not without irony: herding diverse financial obligations on 
equal footing as “debt” into a needs-based financial restructuring precludes 
open discussion of the political character of some claims and shuts out 
consideration of creditor behavior.125 
The next section examines the implications of these analogies from U.S. 
debtor–creditor law for the problem of odious debt. 
V 
SOVEREIGN UN-DEBT 
The literature on sovereign debt rests in large part on reasoning by analogy 
to domestic bankruptcy.126 Scholars writing in this area are well aware of the 
political character of the state, the impossibility of liquidation and valuation, 
and the gaps in legitimacy and authority that distinguish the sovereign context 
 
 122. In re Mobile Steel Co., 563 F.2d 692, 699–700 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 123. In re Fabricators, Inc., 926 F.2d 1458, 1465 (5th Cir. 1991). 
 124. The sovereign context lacks two elements: a system of payment priorities, and a process 
whereby this system is engaged to join form and substance and to remedy inequitable conduct. 
 125. Debt negotiators realize and occasionally reflect the political character of the debt in 
restructuring agreements, as in the example of the Paris Club’s treatment of U.S. military assistance to 
Vietnam. However, official accounts go to great lengths to obscure the political character of the 
outcome, reflecting domestic legal and political constraints in creditor countries. See supra note 76. 
 126. See Rogoff & Zettelmeyer, supra note 41, for an overview. See Jeffrey Sachs, Do We Need an 
International Lender of Last Resort?, Frank D. Graham Lecture at Princeton University (Apr. 20, 
1995), available at http://www.earthinstitute.columbia.edu/about/director/pubs/intllr.pdf; Bulow, supra 
note 55; Bolton & Skeel, supra note 10; and Kunibert Raffer, Applying Chapter 9 Insolvency to 
International Debts: An Economically Efficient Solution with a Human Face, 18 World Development 
301 (1990), for prominent examples. 
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from its domestic counterparts.127 Of immediate relevance here, subordination 
and recharacterization presuppose a single collective proceeding framed by 
statute, a far cry from the customary sequence of loosely coordinated 
restructuring arrangements between the sovereign debtor and the various 
creditor groups. In practice, sovereign-debt priority does not mean first dibs on 
liquidation proceeds, but first dibs on scarce fiscal resources. The focus is on 
cashflows, not liquidation value; the question is whether foreign bondholders 
get the next coupon payment in full while local banks forbear and teachers go 
unpaid. 128 
Even as such disclaimers have become routine, the domestic analogy 
remains inherently risky: adopting complex domestic-law doctrines may taint 
the analysis with more unstated assumptions about the parties’ motives, 
incentives, politics, and the administrative-enforcement context of the debtor–
creditor relationship.129 At the other extreme, and at the risk of treating 
domestic doctrines as shallow shorthand for simple ideas, this article draws on 
recharacterization and equitable subordination (conflated at this level of 
generality) for two very basic insights. First, for an obligation to be treated as 
debt, it must have certain characteristics that give rise to the expectation of 
priority repayment. Second, when a relationship is documented as debt, but 
lacks some or all such characteristics, the obligation may not be honored 
according to its terms. It may lose repayment priority to other claims on the 
debtor, or may not be paid at all. 
These two points have wide-ranging implications for odious debt and 
sovereign debt but do not lend themselves easily to policy prescriptions. First, it 
is not obvious that the same characteristics that give rise to priority for 
commercial debt should give rise to priority for official debt. Norway’s recent 
debt cancellation initiative is instructive. In October 2006, the government 
announced that it would cancel unconditionally about $80 million in debts owed 
to it by Ecuador, Egypt, Jamaica, Myanmar, Peru, Sierra Leone, and Sudan on 
the grounds that the debts were illegitimate. They were illegitimate because 
they did not serve the borrowers’ development needs.130 The debts were 
 
 127. See, e.g., Tarullo, supra note 103; Rasmussen, supra note 88, at 1163; ROUBINI & SETSER, supra 
note 42 (including extensive discussions of problems and implications of the domestic analogy). Cf. 
Carlson’s admonition against reasoning by metaphor (quoting Justice Cardozo) when analyzing 
equitable subordination. Carlson, supra note 12, at 160–61. 
 128. I have suggested elsewhere that for public entities that cannot be liquidated (including states 
and municipalities), insolvency is framed in cashflow terms. Different categories of debt may be paid in 
order from a state’s primary budget surplus. Gelpern, supra note 10, at 1155. The legal challenges 
inherent in the concept of priority in sovereign debt are most apparent in the debates about the pari 
passu clause. See Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah S. Pam, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt 
Instruments, 53 EMORY L.J. 869 (2004), and William W. Bratton, Pari Passu and a Distressed 
Sovereign’s Rational Choices, 53 EMORY L.J. 823 (2004), for different perspectives. 
 129. Pérez and Weissman make a related argument questioning the utility of private-law analogies 
in a public context that is sovereign debt. Pérez & Weissman, supra note 63, at 44. 
 130. Cancellation of Debts Resulting from Norwegian Ship Export Campaign, Royal Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Release No. 118/06 and Fact Sheet/Report  (Oct. 2, 2006), 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/Pressesenter/pressemeldinger/2006/Cancellation-of-debts-
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incurred as part of Norway’s export credit program to support its shipbuilding 
industry in the late 1970s. This initiative is consistent with past episodes of 
sovereign-debt forgiveness inasmuch as it is unilateral and discretionary on 
Norway’s part. But it also breaks with precedent in three ways.  First, relief is 
ostensibly unconditional. Second, related, it goes to “pariah states” such as 
Myanmar and Sudan, alongside states generally in good standing with the 
international community. The idea is to shift the focus from debtor to creditor 
responsibility. However, Myanmar and Sudan do not get relief from Norway 
until they become eligible for multilateral debt relief.131 Third, Norway’s 
initiative challenges the established rationale for export credit: the mandate of 
export-credit agencies is to support national exports and “level the international 
playing field” for creditor-country exporters. They are not aid agencies; 
development benefits to the borrowing state are incidental to their domestic 
mission.132 
Judged by commercial-debt standards, a market-based export credit 
extended entirely in the creditor’s self-interest might merit repayment ahead of 
a development loan extended for the benefit of the recipient. Norway’s move 
implies instead that commercial-looking official loans should be repaid only 
when they serve the needs of the recipient and produce good economic 
outcomes, which would make export credits look like some combination of aid 
and equity. Traditional export lending would lose its claim to priority 
repayment.133 
While applying different priority criteria to official and private debt is 
reasonable in view of their different functions, it poses an administrative 
challenge for restructuring a debt stock that includes both. One way to resolve 
the problem is to pick one scale over the other—subordinate all official debt to 
 
resulting-from-the-Norwegian-Ship-Export-Campaign-1976-80.html?id=272158 (last visited Oct. 2, 
2007). The Development Minister first mooted the initiative in May. International Development 
Minister Eric Solheim’s Statement to the Storting (May 16, 2006), http://www.regjeringen.no/ 
en/dep/ud/About-the-Ministry/Minister-of-International-Development-Er/Speeches-and-articles/2006/ 
International-Development-Minister-Erik-Solheims-statement-to-the-Storting-16-may-2006.html?id= 
420850 (last visited Oct. 2, 2007). For NGO reactions, see Norway Makes Groundbreaking Decision to 
Cancel Illegitimate Debt, EURODAD (Oct. 3, 2006), http://www.eurodad.org/whatsnew/articles/ 
aspx?id=302 (last visited Oct. 2, 2007). 
 131. See Report, supra note 130.  Here Norway is (understandably) on both sides of the fence: 
making Myanmar and Sudan technically eligible bolsters the image of unconditional relief; linking the 
write-off to multilateral action imports economic and human rights conditionality. 
 132. See, e.g., Rita M. Rodriguez, Ex-Im Bank: Overview, Challenges, and Policy Options, in 
Hufbauer & Rodriguez, supra note 80, at 5, 6, 21. A recent OECD agreement on Unproductive 
Expenditures is an exception that proves the rule: major export-credit agencies agreed to refrain from 
financing “unproductive expenditures” in Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) that may benefit 
from official debt relief under the HIPC initiative. “Unproductive activities” are those that do not 
contribute to social or economic development and are not consistent with the borrower’s poverty-
reduction strategy. OECD, Official Export Credit Support to Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPCs) Statement of Principles, http://www.oecd.org/document/27/0,2340,en_2649_34179_2675739_ 
1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited May 7, 2007). The implication of the principles is that financing 
unproductive expenditures is permissible in non-HIPCs. 
 133. Another reading of Norway’s initiative would be as an admission of bad faith, complicity in 
fraud or corruption, where the remedy is to void the transaction. Cf. Buchheit et al., supra note 1. 
05__GELPERN.DOC 12/6/2007  9:00:26 AM 
110 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 70:81 
all private debt, or vice versa.134 Either scenario would eliminate Paris Club 
comparability (a political problem), but would be much simpler than reconciling 
two priority scales. 
As an alternative to blanket subordination, it is possible to engage in 
detailed loan-by-loan analysis of official and private debt, using something like 
the three-, eleven- and thirteen-part tests fashioned by U.S. courts in equitable 
subordination and recharacterization decisions. This might ultimately reveal a 
category of sovereign “un-debt”—financial relationships that include a promise 
to repay, in which the repayment expectation may be attenuated by factors such 
as: 
1. The purpose of the loan 
2. The extent to which loan proceeds actually benefited the debtor 
3. The expectation of repayment, as evidenced by 
a. A formal promise to repay 
b. An enforceable agreement 
c. A history of enforcement 
d. Sources of repayment 
e. The borrower’s creditworthiness at the time of the loan 
4. The extent of operational control by the creditor, as evidenced by 
the breadth and depth of policy conditionality. 
Such criteria may apply differently to private and official lending. For 
example, any commercial purpose and use of proceeds short of 
misappropriation might confer priority on private credits. The same might not 
be enough for official credits, especially those laden with policy conditions. The 
latter could be held to a higher standard of benefit to the debtor, on the 
Norwegian or similar model, subordinating loans for “unproductive” 
expenditures that are neither corrupt nor oppressive.135 Private creditors may get 
extra scrutiny in other areas, such as lending to borrowers that patently lack 
repayment capacity.136 Among official lenders, multilateral institutions may 
come ahead of bilateral ones using the illustrative criteria above because the 
former are generally barred from lending for political or security operations, 
and at least ostensibly reap no benefit from the loans.137 Drawing again from 
 
 134. Bulow et al. argue that official debt is de facto subordinate in any event. Supra note 49. The 
traditional arguments for the IFIs’ preferred creditor status and the priority of certain government 
claims in domestic bankruptcy point in the opposite direction. 
 135. See supra note 132 for a discussion of the recent OECD initiative on unproductive 
expenditures. 
 136. The existing literature on odious debt, including recent symposia, e.g., Symposium, Odious 
Debts and State Corruption, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (Summer 2007); 70 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. (forthcoming Autumn 2007); 33 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. (forthcoming 2007), has gone a 
long way to elaborate the conditions under which private debt should be unenforceable or 
subordinated. 
 137. Rodrik, supra note 54 (arguing that multilateral agencies are less “political” in their lending). 
Compare Alesina & Dollar, supra note 54 (on bilateral creditors). But see Martens, supra note 86 
(noting that aid agencies broker compromises among donor priorities and that pressing a donor to 
depart substantially from its priorities may prompt it to withdraw). 
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equitable-subordination decisions, multilaterals may also benefit from their 
status as lenders of last resort—a position that underlies the preferred creditor 
status they have been accorded in practice.138 Bilateral military loans to support 
puppet regimes would be prime candidates for subordination. Even at the far 
extreme of this framework, the subordination remedy would not deny the 
existence of an obligation to repay; it would demote it to reflect economic and 
moral factors.139 
Such a detailed approach presents at least two problems. First, regardless of 
the criteria, it is inadministrable in the existing institutional context. It would 
rely on an adjudication apparatus that does not exist, and for which there is no 
appetite in the international community. Moreover, even if it were mechanically 
viable, case-by-case adjudication would be immensely time-consuming and 
would fail to deliver relief in a meaningful timeframe. 
Second, the already cumbersome analysis must get messier still to address 
the growing number of assignment and securitization transactions that put 
official debt in the hands of private creditors. For example, a relatively 
straightforward 2007 case in the United Kingdom involved Zambia’s Cold War 
debt to Romania. In the late 1970s, Zambia bought agricultural machinery on 
credit from Romania. Twenty years later, Zambia was an early candidate for 
debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, which 
would wipe out most of its official debt. Instead of writing off the debt, 
Romania sold it to a private investor, who succeeded in reviving it as private 
debt under murky circumstances. Under the court’s ruling, Zambia could lose a 
substantial portion of its annual debt relief.140 The original bilateral instrument 
was unenforceable in court under the U.K. State Immunity Act, and in other 
respects might look like the ideal “un-debt.” Whether its status changed with 
assignment and subsequent renegotiation requires another layer of analysis. 
An approach based in radical separation between private and official debt 
could simplify matters. One way to accomplish separation would be to limit the 
scope for assignment of official debt to private creditors. For example, 
multilateral or domestic measures in major financial jurisdictions could make 
official bilateral debt unenforceable in court if assigned to a private entity 
without recourse to the official creditor.141 
 
 138. Rutsel Silvestre J. Martha, Preferred Creditor Status under International Law: The Case of the 
International Monetary Fund, 39 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 801 (1990). 
 139. It would also provide a more coherent legal and economic basis for a determination that debt is 
“uncollectible,” as in the case of Vietnam.  See supra note 77. Ironically, the borrower’s sovereign 
character may help subordinated lenders: without liquidation and barring repudiation, even the most 
junior may eventually claim some part of the debtor’s primary surplus.  In contrast, equity holders 
usually get nothing at liquidation. 
 140. Donegal Int’l Limited v. Republic of Zambia [2007] EWHC197 (Comm). 
 141. The Donegal court suggested that, notwithstanding the assignment, Zambia might have 
benefited from sovereign immunity; however, Zambia waived it for the benefit of the private creditor 
when it renegotiated the debt. A strict no-assignment rule would pose a problem for states that sell or 
securitize bilateral debt (an established if relatively infrequent practice) and, without proper carve-outs, 
could curb debt-for-nature exchanges and similar transactions. A full discussion of the merits of official 
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Implementation challenges aside, the concept of sovereign “un-debt,” 
loosely drawn from U.S. debtor–creditor law, is a useful analytical and 
rhetorical tool. It shares a moral impulse with this body of law, demoting 
obligations when the debt form is used to mislead (disguised grants), or to 
entrench privileged creditor control with no corresponding benefit to the debtor 
(propping up dictators).142 “Un-debt” offers a way to think beyond the 
traditional constraints of sovereign-debt form without simply discarding it as if 
it never happened (along with donor country legislation authorizing it). This 
analytical lens is important because even when the obligation ultimately goes 
unpaid, the debt form may frame a decades-long financial, economic, and 
political relationship. Calling loans grants after the fact, or grounding relief in 
financial need alone, precludes consideration of this relationship. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
FROM ODIOUS DEBT TO SOVEREIGN “UN-DEBT” 
The Cold War and its various reverberations in the second half of the 
twentieth century helped bring about a surge in official lending. Although 
government-to-government loans are not without precedent, they had been 
relatively rare until then. As the new loans grew in scale and scope, their goals 
came to encompass military and political support, economic development, 
export promotion, and all manner of other strategic and humanitarian 
objectives—in short, everything governments do abroad.143 The loan form 
helped secure domestic political support for foreign transfers, but also to 
entrench policy influence and bolster long-term relationships among states. 
Over time, other justifications for the loan form accreted, including the salutary 
role of credit in promoting repayment discipline among wayward countries. 
Official lending was particularly important for poor countries and suspect 
regimes that had limited sources of external financing or that made a living by 
trading in political loyalties. It is therefore unsurprising that official loans 
dominated the debt stocks recently bequeathed by twentieth century despots to 
their successors. Inasmuch as the overarching goal of an Odious Debt Doctrine 
is to free the people from paying for the sins of their rulers, it cannot avoid 
dealing with official debt. 
 
debt assignment is beyond the scope of this article; however, two points bear mention. First, a no-
assignment rule is unlikely to affect the price or availability of official credit when it is extended for 
non-economic reasons. Second, assignment of official debt to private-market participants arguably runs 
counter to the assumptions underlying the institutional structure of coordinated official debt 
restructuring: the Paris Club mechanism might work differently if a hedge fund held Italy’s economic 
interest in Argentina’s debt, along with a claim against Argentina that might be litigated in court. 
 142. Compare Skeel & Krause-Vilmar, supra note 114, at 268–76 (discussing Truth and 
Nonhindrance). 
 143. Alesina & Dollar, supra note 46 (arguing that colonial past- and political alliances are the 
major determinants of foreign aid). 
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The easiest way to deal with official loans would be to call them grants and 
simply disregard the repayment promise, either at the time of state succession 
or at the time of financial distress. This is roughly the position that united 
international debt-relief advocates in the NGO community and Bush  
administration officials.144 Private creditors made a similar argument when they 
complained about being forced into comparability with “political” loans, though 
they did not go so far as to advocate repudiation. They wanted to dissociate 
their obligations from those held by official creditors, but made no affirmative 
case for how official credits should be treated.145 
The diversity of instruments in corporate finance, and especially the 
bankruptcy debates about recharacterization and equitable subordination, 
suggest that there is room for a much more nuanced analysis of sovereign 
obligations—including obligations to other governments and public 
institutions—to help ground a more sound and fair policy approach. These 
debates may point to a useful analytic device, but fall far short of determining a 
policy proposal. Unpacking the debt form and using the result as a basis for 
demoting a claim on a state’s fiscal resources would reflect better the 
increasingly complex financial and political reality of sovereign finance. Like 
some of the recent writing on odious debt (but unlike most theories of 
sovereign debt), it also examines creditor motivations and behavior. 
The analysis could support a range of prescriptions to deal with odious debt. 
Key policy design questions include timing: would the framework be available 
at all times, only in times of financial distress, or only in cases of state 
succession? The framework could be entirely self-judging and self-administered 
(announced by the borrower as grounds for preferential repayment—or by the 
lender, such as Norway, as grounds for unilateral forgiveness), applied by a 
third party (a national court, a standing international institution or a special 
tribunal), or advisory (applied in the context of existing restructuring 
mechanisms). It could support loan-by-loan analysis or subordinate entire 
categories of claims. As with all proposals concerning sovereign debt, the 
problem of enforcement looms large.  Above all, the utility of this approach 
may be limited when the starting presumption is that private and official 
lending to poor countries are inextricably linked in an oppressive political 
system, following arguments by Pérez and Weissman and Backer.146 
The task of comprehensive policy design goes far beyond the problem of 
odious debt and is beyond the scope of this symposium contribution. The goal 
of this article has been to identify an important gap in policy and theoretical 
approaches to sovereign debt using the example of odious official lending. The 
central implication of the analysis is the need for the law and policy to recognize 
the existing complexity of sovereign obligations, including official debt, and to 
 
 144. Supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 145. See, e.g., Rieffel, supra note 47, at 281–86. 
 146. Supra notes 63 & 19. 
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examine the significance of debt form in sovereign finance. The world of 
corporate debt has long dealt with these questions. It is high time the world of 
sovereign debt began. 
